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Judicial Resistance and Legal Change
Matthew Toksont
Conventional models of judicial behavior assume that, barring extraordinary
circumstances, lower courts will comply with changes in governing law. The few
studies that have examined judicial compliance with higher-court decisions have
concluded that judges quickly adopt even controversial new doctrines.
This Article challenges these conventional accounts of judicial compliance. It
presents several surprising examples of widespread and persistent judicial defi-
ance of new doctrines. Judges often apply old, overturned laws instead of new
laws-and they do so in observable and predictable ways. For instance, this phe-
nomenon is especially common when a low-decision-cost regime is replaced with a
high-decision-cost regime, as when a rule is changed to a standard.
This Article posits that judges are influenced by biases and incentives that
can cause them to strongly prefer familiar laws to unfamiliar ones and simple
laws to complex ones. These preferences shape judicial behavior and can engender
overt noncompliance with new laws. This Article proposes a new model of judicial
compliance and demonstrates how the model can successfully predict future judi-
cial behavior. It then suggests ways of reducing judicial resistance to legal change.
This Article's theoretical and empirical findings also shed light on current legal
debates, including broader debates about the efficacy of court-driven social change.
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INTRODUCTION
Changes in law, especially drastic or controversial ones,
have at times met with strong political or cultural resistance. In
the wake of Brown v Board of Education of Topeka,' for in-
stance, state and local officials across the Jim Crow South led a
decades-long campaign of opposition to the desegregation of
schools and other public institutions.2 Scholars have identified a
number of impediments to courts' abilities to shape society, in-
cluding institutional weakness,3 political resistance, 4 and sticky
1 347 US 483 (1954).
2 See, for example, Gerald N. Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring
About Social Change? 78-88 (Chicago 2d ed 2008).
3 See, for example, Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Su-
preme Court at the Bar of Politics 266-68 (Yale 2d ed 1986).
4 See generally, for example, Michael J. Klarman, From the Closet to the Altar:
Courts, Backlash, and the Struggle for Same-Sex Marriage (Oxford 2013). See also Ros-
enberg, The Hollow Hope at 57-58, 74, 367-68 (cited in note 2); J.W. Peltason, Fifty.
Eight Lonely Men: Southern Federal Judges and School Desegregation 41-42, 93 (Har-
court, Brace & World 1961).
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social norms.5 Some have expressed skepticism about courts'
abilities to effect progressive changes in society or to protect po-
litically disadvantaged minorities from oppression by majorities
or powerful interest groups. 6 The practical impact of legal
change bears on fundamental questions of the role of the judicial
branch and the importance of law as a discipline.
New legal doctrines are meant to influence citizens and in-
stitutions by shifting incentives or altering the legal standards
that apply to certain types of activity. A crucial first step toward
changing society through the legal system is changing the prac-
tices of the courts charged with applying new laws. This initial
step is often taken for granted and generally receives little at-
tention. Conventional studies and accounts of lower court behav-
ior assume that courts nearly always comply with controlling
doctrine, except perhaps in areas of profound political or cultural
disagreement.
This Article challenges that assumption. Its findings sug-
gest that the conventional model of judicial compliance is, in
many ways, inaccurate and incomplete. Although the standard
model considers political preferences, it largely fails to incorpo-
rate nonideological preferences, which can influence judicial be-
havior even more strongly. As this Article shows, judges are just
as susceptible to many of the same unconscious biases, aversions
to costs, and preferences for the familiar status quo as the rest
of us.
Judges may be motivated to resist legal changes that in-
crease their decision costs by increasing the time and effort nec-
essary to address a legal issue or by increasing the cognitive diffi-
culty of decisionmaking. They can also develop biases in favor of
laws that they have repeatedly applied and justified in the past.
And they may develop preferences for familiar doctrines and an
aversion to any departure from a long-standing status quo.
Further, these preferences and biases can manifest as actu-
al, widespread noncompliance with controlling doctrine. For ex-
ample, judges may in practice refuse to follow new laws that
would substantially increase their decision costs. Or, because
judges can develop strong preferences for routinely applied doc-
trines, they may continue to apply those doctrines long after the
doctrines have been expressly overturned by a higher court.
5 See generally, for example, Dan M. Kahan, Gentle Nudges vs. Hard Shoves: Solu-
ing the Sticky Norms Problem, 67 U Chi L Rev 607 (2000).
6 See, for example, Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope at 15-21 (cited in note 2).
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Judicial resistance to legal change can be observed in a wide va-
riety of areas, including torts, securities, copyright, patent, and
criminal law.7 This Article discusses several examples of such
resistance, taken from contexts where selection effectss are ab-
sent or unlikely, or where judicial defiance is overt and directly
observable. Judicial resistance can virtually nullify the effects of
doctrinal change in some contexts, and it can also be seen in sit-
uations in which judicial behavior changes substantially but still
gravitates toward an old, defunct rule. 9
This Article develops a new model of judicial compliance
with legal change that accounts for the influence of costs, biases,
and preferences for status quo doctrines. This model can be used
to more accurately predict judicial behavior in a variety of con-
texts.'0 Moreover, understanding the nature of judicial re-
sistance to legal change may allow legal actors to look for new
ways to effectively change lower court behavior. Extrajudicial
monitoring of lower court compliance, educating judges about
basic statistical concepts relevant to new legal tests, and repeat-
ed, salient disavowals of old doctrines can all decrease the like-
lihood of judicial defiance. Finally, this Article's account of judg-
es' responses to legal change suggests that scholars should
consider lower court compliance before drawing conclusions
about new doctrines. A multilevel approach may be necessary to
accurately assess the true impact of a doctrinal change.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I reviews conven-
tional accounts of judicial compliance with controlling law and
summarizes the standard model of how courts respond to doctri-
nal change. Part II describes potential sources of judicial re-
sistance to legal change. It examines judges' aversion to in-
creased decision costs and the preferences that judges may
develop over time for familiar doctrines. It then integrates this
analysis with existing accounts of judicial behavior to develop a
new model of judicial compliance with legal change. Part III
7 See Parts III, IV.A.
8 "Selection effects" refers to the tendency of the set of litigated cases to change
when legal standards change, which can make it difficult to measure changes in plaintiff
win rates in litigated cases. See text accompanying note 118. See also generally George
L. Priest and Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J Legal Stud 1
(1984).
9 See Part IV.A.
10 See, for example, Part III.E (showing in an empirical test that the model accu-
rately predicts the behavior of courts applying the qualified immunity doctrine, and that
the conventional model's prediction is incorrect).
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presents evidence supporting this new model and surveys exam-
ples of resistance to legal change from a variety of legal areas. It
also reports the results of an original study of courts' applica-
tions of qualified immunity doctrine, which demonstrates the
persistent influence of overturned law. Part IV discusses the
implications of this Article's account of judicial noncompliance
with legal change. Specifically, it examines evidence that judi-
cial resistance is ubiquitous and acts as a drag on legal change
even when lower court behavior otherwise changes significantly.
It describes how the new model of judicial compliance can be
used to predict (and potentially shape) future judicial behavior.
Finally, it discusses obstacles to practical legal change and of-
fers some potential means of more effectively altering lower
court practices.
I. CONVENTIONAL ACCOUNTS OF JUDICIAL COMPLIANCE
Few previous studies have examined judicial compliance
with legal change, either generally or across a range of subjects.
Several reports have, however, examined the extent to which
lower courts follow controlling doctrine set out in a particular
case or line of cases. Virtually all these studies have examined
compliance after a major and controversial Supreme Court deci-
sion, because researchers have concluded that such decisions are
most likely to produce noncompliance. Nonetheless, very few
surveys of judicial behavior have found detectable noncompli-
ance by lower courts, even in politically charged areas. This Part
examines the literature on judicial compliance-paying special
attention to studies of noncompliance-and summarizes the
conventional model of how courts respond to doctrinal change.
A. Doctrinal Compliance
Scholars examining judicial responses to changes in doctrine
have concluded that lower courts normally comply with higher
courts' rulings. This conclusion may seem rather obvious to
readers with law degrees. Lawyers take as a given that lower
courts obey doctrinal commands, whether statutory or preceden-
tial. Thus, when the Supreme Court or Congress changes the
law-say, by discarding an old rule and adopting a new one-
lower courts will apply the new rule. Even the most pragmatic
20151
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scholars of judicial behavior assume that "the lower courts fall
into line" with new decisions of higher courts."
Political scientists generally take a more jaundiced view of
judicial behavior, but they too conclude that judges virtually al-
ways comply with doctrinal imperatives. Although political sci-
entists tend to examine judicial compliance in controversial or
politically charged areas, in which noncompliance is expected to
be highest, their studies have "found nearly universal compli-
ance" with the new rulings of higher courts. 12
Observers have suggested several potential reasons for this
high level of compliance. Judges may be averse to having their
noncompliant decisions reversed by a higher court. 3 A related
incentive for compliance is bolstering one's reputation and pres-
tige. 14 Finally, judges may have internalized norms of compli-
ance through their professional training or may prize compliance
because it is an essential part of their conception of their role as
a judge.15 For these reasons, outright defiance of higher-court
11 Lee Epstein, William M. Landes, and Richard A. Posner, The Behavior of Federal
Judges: A Theoretical and Empirical Study of Rational Choice 41 (Harvard 2013).
12 Donald R. Songer, Jeffrey A. Segal, and Charles M. Cameron, The Hierarchy of
Justice: Testing a Principal-Agent Model of Supreme Court-Circuit Court Interactions, 38
Am J Polit Sci 673, 693 (1994). See also, for example, Jennifer K. Luse, et al, "Such Infe-
rior Courts ..." Compliance by Circuits with Jurisprudential Regimes, 37 Am Politics
Rsrch 75, 92 (2009) (concluding that lower courts are entirely compliant with the test
from Lemon v Kurtzman, 403 US 602 (1971)); Sara C. Benesh and Malia Reddick, Over-
ruled: An Event History Analysis of Lower Court Reaction to Supreme Court Alteration of
Precedent, 64 J Politics 534, 536 (2002) (noting that scholars have found "little evidence
of outright defiance" of Supreme Court precedent); Donald R. Songer and Reginald S.
Sheehan, Supreme Court Impact on Compliance and Outcomes: Miranda and New York
Times in the United States Courts of Appeals, 43 W Polit Q 297, 306-08 (1990) (finding
that lower courts did not defy controversial Supreme Court decisions); Neil T. Romans,
The Role of State Supreme Courts in Judicial Policy Making: Escobedo, Miranda and the
Use of Judicial Impact Analysis, 27 W Polit Q 38, 56 (1974) (examining state court com-
pliance and finding complete doctrinal compliance with a controversial Supreme Court
decision despite differing degrees of expansion or restriction).
13 See William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, Rational Judicial Behavior: A
Statistical Study, 1 J Legal Analysis 775, 780 (2009); Susan B. Haire, Stefanie A. Lind-
quist, and Donald R. Songer, Appellate Court Supervision in the Federal Judiciary: A
Hierarchical Perspective, 37 L & Society Rev 143, 147 (2003). This effect is generally
thought to be weak, however, while high levels of compliance are observed even in situa-
tions in which the possibility of reversal is effectively zero. See David E. Klein and Robert
J. Hume, Fear of Reversal as an Explanation of Lower Court Compliance, 37 L & Society
Rev 579, 583, 600-01 (2003); Haire, Lindquist, and Songer, 37 L & Society Rev at 146.
14 See Landes and Posner, 1 J Legal Analysis at 780 (cited in note 13); Klein and
Hume, 37 L & Society Rev at 581 (cited in note 13).
15 See Haire, Lindquist, and Songer, 37 L & Society Rev at 147 (cited in note 13);
Klein and Hume, 37 L & Society Rev at 581 (cited in note 13).
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decisions is considered highly unlikely, and full compliance with
doctrinal imperatives is the norm.
B. Indirect Noncompliance
Scholars have, however, recognized that courts may engage
in a sort of indirect noncompliance-or at least imperfect com-
pliance-without overtly defying doctrinal imperatives. Judges
might, for instance, intentionally misinterpret the law (or the
facts) in order to circumvent a doctrinal command and reach
their preferred outcome. This is especially likely, legal observers
agree, in the context of highly controversial laws.16 One example
that has received particular attention in the literature is the ex-
clusionary rule. Under Supreme Court precedent, evidence
gathered in violation of the Fourth Amendment is, in most cas-
es, suppressed at trial.17 This can have the unpalatable effect of
setting known criminals free.18 Judges are thought to be reluc-
tant to apply the exclusionary rule, particularly in cases involv-
ing serious crimes. 19 They may therefore intentionally draw er-
roneous legal or factual conclusions that allow them to avoid
applying the rule.20
The exclusionary rule does appear ripe for subversion by
judges. However, evidence on judicial compliance with the Su-
preme Court's search-and-seizure case law suggests that if any
noncompliance exists, it is limited. Lower courts closely follow the
Court's doctrinal commands in search-and-seizure cases, and dif-
ferences in case outcomes among courts are generally attributable
to differences in facts rather than judicial policy preferences.21
16 See, for example, Tonja Jacobi, The Law and Economics of the Exclusionary Rule,
87 Notre Dame L Rev 585, 657-58 (2011); Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope at 89-90 (cited in
note 2). See also Peltason, Fifty-Eight Lonely Men at 93 (cited in note 4).
17 See generally Mapp v Ohio, 367 US 643 (1961).
18 See Jacobi, 87 Notre Dame L Rev at 629, 657 (cited in note 16).
19 See, for example, id at 657. Judges (as well as lawyers) have reported that they
believe that some judges occasionally fail to suppress evidence that they know is illegal.
See, for example, Myron W. Orfield Jr, Deterrence, Perjury, and the Heater Factor: An
Exclusionary Rule in the Chicago Criminal Courts, 63 U Colo L Rev 75, 115 (1992).
20 See David A. Harris, How Accountability-Based Policing Can Reinforce--or Re-
place-the Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule, 7 Ohio St J Crim L 149, 191 (2009);
Orfield, 63 U Colo L Rev at 119 (cited in note 19).
21 See Songer, Segal, and Cameron, 38 Am J Polit Sci at 684-88 (cited in note 12);
Sara C. Benesh and Wendy L. Martinek, Context and Compliance: A Comparison of State
Supreme Courts and the Circuits, 93 Marq L Rev 795, 797-98 (2009). Indirect noncom-
pliance may also be likely in areas in which a change in the law conflicts with strong and
entrenched social norms. Professor Dan Kahan has suggested that judges may be partic-
ularly lenient in sentencing criminals in drunk driving and domestic violence cases
20151
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Legal scholars have focused a great deal of attention on the
political inclinations of judges and how those inclinations may
affect case outcomes. It is possible that judges deciding political-
ly charged cases might go so far as to deliberately undermine
doctrinal precedents with which they disagree in order to ad-
vance a political agenda. Alternatively, similar noncompliance
might occur at an unconscious level, causing strongly biased
judges to make mistakes of legal interpretation or factual as-
sessment that seem obvious to unbiased observers.
Yet those legal scholars who have most closely examined the
effects of political affiliation on case outcomes have suggested
that actual doctrinal noncompliance or subversion is nonexistent
or very limited. First, many areas and issues of law do not have
an obvious political valence. The political world is ignorant of
the vast majority of legal issues that courts address.22 Second, in
many areas of the law that seem relatively politicized or contro-
versial, studies have shown no differences between Democratic-
and Republican-appointed judges.23 Finally, researchers have
found that, even in highly politicized areas in which judges'
votes diverge somewhat based on their political affiliations,
judges appear to agree on the core doctrinal meaning of contro-
versial Supreme Court decisions and obey these doctrinal com-
mands regardless of their party affiliation. 24 Judges generally
differ not on whether to follow Supreme Court decisions but on
how broadly to apply them when faced with new sets of facts.25
This is compatible with evidence that major, controversial rul-
ings by the Supreme Court actually dampen rather than in-
crease ideological divergence among judges, at least in the short
term. Ideological divergence only increases as years go by and
because they are reluctant to fully enforce strict laws against once-tolerated activities.
See Kahan, 67 U Chi L Rev at 628, 633 (cited in note 5). Judges may have also resisted
new laws against sexual harassment by excessively limiting their scope. See id at 638. In
general, when new laws challenge widely held social norms, some judges may attempt to
defend those norms via indirect noncompliance. Such noncompliance, however, may be
minimal in practice. Most of the evidence of norm stickiness in Kahan's article concerns
the behavior of jurors and law-enforcement officers.
22 See Harry T. Edwards and Michael L. Livermore, Pitfalls of Empirical Studies
That Attempt to Understand the Factors Affecting Appellate Decisionmaking, 58 Duke L
J 1895, 1924-27 (2009).
23 This includes areas such as criminal appeals and federalism. See Cass R. Sun-
stein, et al, Are Judges Political? An Empirical Analysis of the Federal Judiciary 48-51
(Brookings 2006).
24 See, for example, id at 88, 106.
25 See id at 106.
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new, related issues arise, requiring judges to decide whether
these rulings should be extended or limited.26
Further, and even when using an expansive conception of
noncompliance,27 political scientists have generally found high
levels of compliance in controversial and politically charged
areas.28 This is true even in the federal courts of appeals, which
the Supreme Court cannot directly supervise in more than a
small percentage of cases due to the Court's relatively small
docket. Despite the low probability of review, the circuit courts
"appear to be relatively faithful agents of their principal, the
Supreme Court," in terms of both doctrine and policy outcomes.
29
C. Direct Noncompliance
Observers have noted that, in very rare cases, courts may
engage in overt noncompliance with the doctrinal imperatives of
higher courts.30 For instance, the Supreme Court's school-
desegregation ruling in Brown fundamentally challenged the
cultural and social structure of the American South. It resulted
in enormous political and legal controversy, and it engendered a
massive campaign of resistance at the state and local levels
across the Deep South. It also reshaped the politics of these
states, as racial moderates became unelectable and only politi-
cians who vowed to fight the Court's mandate of desegregated
schools remained viable. 31 In this highly charged environment,
and facing incredible social pressure from the communities in
which they and their families lived,32 Southern judges some-
times engaged in direct noncompliance with the Supreme
26 See id at 88-106.
27 For a discussion of the very broad definition of noncompliance used by some po-
litical scientists, see Emery G. Lee III, Precedent Direction and Compliance: Horizontal
Stare Decisis on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, 1 Seton Hall Cir Rev 5,
8-9 (2005); Scott D. McClurg and Scott A. Comparato, Rebellious or Just Misunderstood?
Assessing Measures of Lower Court Compliance with U.S. Supreme Court Precedent *30-
31 (unpublished article, Southern Illinois University Carbondale, 2004), archived at
http://perma.cc/V3VA-EBK2.
28 See, for example, Songer and Sheehan, 43 W Polit Q at 306 (cited in note 12)
(finding very high rates of compliance with Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436 (1966));
Luse, et al, 37 Am Politics Rsrch at 92 (cited in note 12) (finding total compliance with
Lemon v Kurtzman).
29 Songer, Segal, and Cameron, 38 Am J Polit Sci at 690 (cited in note 12).
30 Overt noncompliance with statutory commands, which is discussed in Part
III.B.2, has not previously been reported in the judicial-compliance literature.
31 See Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope at 78-79 (cited in note 2).
32 Seeid at 90.
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Court's ruling. This noncompliance took several forms. One fed-
eral judge attempted to reverse Brown on the basis that blacks
were not intelligent enough to attend school with whites. 33 An-
other refused to require desegregation and criticized the Su-
preme Court for failing to understand the South.34 Several judg-
es upheld state laws designed to prevent compliance with
Brown.35 There were also countless examples of indirect non-
compliance via delay, bad-faith legal interpretation, and the bi-
ased use of discretion.36
The ultimate impact of Brown in the Deep South is a matter
of great controversy. What is clear is that judges' defiance sub-
stantially blunted the practical effect of Brown's dramatic doc-
trinal change.37 Judicial resistance to Brown "posed a serious ob-
stacle to civil rights in the South."38
D. The Conventional Model of How Courts Respond to Legal
Change
This Section will draw from the studies discussed above to
elaborate the conventional account of judicial compliance with
doctrinal change. That account runs approximately as follows:
lower court judges are likely motivated to comply with new doc-
trines by aversion to reversal, concerns for their reputation, and
their own conceptions of duty and the judicial role. Scholars
have concluded that lower courts follow the doctrinal mandates
of higher courts in virtually all cases. When applicable law
changes, even drastically, lower courts will adopt and apply the
changed law "immediately and overwhelmingly."39 Very few
studies have bothered to look for noncompliance in less contro-
versial areas, and those few studies that have done so have not
found any noncompliance.40
33 See id at 89.
34 See Peltason, Fifty-Eight Lonely Men at 213 (cited in note 4).
35 See Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope at 89 (cited in note 2).
36 See id at 89, 320. See also Peltason, Fifty-Eight Lonely Men at 68, 70, 74, 115,
121 (cited in note 4).
37 See Peltason, Fifty-Eight Lonely Men at 93 (cited in note 4).
38 Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope at 91 (cited in note 2).
39 John Gruhl, The Supreme Court's Impact on the Law of Libel: Compliance by
Lower Federal Courts, 33 W Polit Q 502, 518-19 (1980). See also Benesh and Reddick, 64
J Politics at 543, 547 (cited in note 12) (finding that courts of appeals adopt changed doc-
trines very quickly-generally, in the second decision in which they are applicable).
40 See Gruhl, 33 W Polit Q at 504, 518 (cited in note 39).
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However, in highly controversial and politically charged ar-
eas of law, courts may respond to legal change in a variety of
ways. They may exhibit complete doctrinal and policy compli-
ance, as usual, or they may engage in indirect noncompliance. In
extremely rare situations, such as when a higher court attempts
to impose transformative cultural and social changes via law,
lower court judges might directly defy or disregard new legal
mandates.
Further, in many cases involving politically charged topics,
judges may exhibit a bias toward their preferred political out-
come. But these judges appear to obey the core doctrines of new
legal mandates-even very controversial ones-and to differ on-
ly as to how narrowly or broadly to apply new rulings. Evidence
suggests that when the Supreme Court changes doctrine in po-
litically charged areas, both liberal and conservative judges
change their behavior in response, even as they continue to di-
verge in marginal cases.41
The conventional account of how courts react to legal change
is plausible and intuitively appealing, and there is at least some
empirical support for many of its premises. The next Part both
expands on and challenges this account. It identifies substantial
gaps and errors in current conceptions of how judges react to le-
gal change. And it proposes a deeper theoretical account of the
process of legal change in the lower courts.
II. SOURCES OF JUDICIAL RESISTANCE TO LEGAL CHANGE
The conventional model of judicial compliance with legal
change represents a kind of judicial exceptionalism. Accustomed
to considering the many ways in which judges behave differently
from other legal or political actors, scholars of judicial behavior
may have neglected the ways in which judges behave like every-
one else. Studies of behavior from a variety of other fields sug-
gest a markedly different model of judicial compliance. This Part
begins to develop such a model, accounting for both general the-
ories of human behavior and the unique context of judicial
decisionmaking.
This model is based on three potential influences on judicial
behavior that may cause judges to actively defy new laws. The
41 See Songer, Segal, and Cameron, 38 Am J Polit Sci at 688 (cited in note 12);
Benesh and Reddick, 64 J Politics at 546-47 (cited in note 12) (finding that the ideology
of circuit court judges does not seem to affect doctrinal compliance).
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first is judges' resistance to the greater time and effort costs that
may be associated with new legal regimes. The second is judges'
aversion to the increased cognitive difficulty of their decisions
under complex new laws. And the third is judges' tendency to
develop strong preferences for familiar, status quo doctrines.
The ensuing sections describe these effects, all of which can in-
fluence judges to resist changes to current legal regimes.
A. Time and Effort Costs
As discussed above, the conventional model of judicial re-
sponses to legal change incorporates political and policy prefer-
ences. But it largely fails to address nonideological preferences,
including preferences driven by the costs that judges face when
deciding cases.
Let us start with the assumption that people seek to mini-
mize costs and maximize benefits, at least if no other considera-
tions apply. So, all else being equal, if driving to work on the
traffic-heavy Beltway takes forty minutes, while driving on the
wide-open George Washington Parkway takes twenty minutes, a
busy and traffic-hating commuter will prefer the Parkway.
Certain changes in legal doctrine will increase (or decrease)
costs for judges. For example, a higher court may replace a sim-
ple, bright-line rule with a standard that requires more time
and effort to apply, or a basic standard with a more complicated
one, or a clear-cut rule with one that involves a more difficult
factual inquiry. These changes would increase the overall costs
to judges of deciding cases and writing opinions. And they would
do so in concrete ways: by increasing the amount of time that a
judge spends preparing for trial, researching a legal question, or
writing an opinion. They would likely also increase the length of
opinions, the number (and length) of motions filed by parties,
the time spent addressing motions and holding hearings, and
the number of orders that judges must issue.
All else being equal, judges will prefer legal doctrines with
lower implementation costs. They will tend to disfavor legal doc-
trines that impose higher decision costs in terms of time re-
quired for deciding cases and writing opinions. This may lead
them to overtly defy these doctrines. Judicial aversion to in-
creased costs may also operate partially at an unconscious level,
subverting judges' good-faith efforts to properly apply the law.
Of course, cost and convenience are not judges' only consid-
erations. The conventional model seems to implicitly assume
[82:901
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that judges' sense of duty in faithfully applying the law42 will
generally cause them to adopt doctrinal changes regardless of
the cost. Or perhaps judges' aversion to reversal or concern for
their own reputations will outweigh any additional costs in the
vast majority of cases. 43 Or judges may simply pass off most of
the additional costs onto their clerks, who may be less able or
less willing to shirk them.44
Whatever the effect of these increased time and effort costs,
their impact is likely greatest when they combine with other,
more subtle decision costs. These less obvious costs are even
more likely to influence judicial behavior at a subconscious level.
The next Section addresses these costs.
B. Cognitive Decision Costs
As discussed above, changes in the law may increase deci-
sion costs for judges. But not all these higher costs will be re-
flected in longer opinions or a greater amount of time necessary
to decide cases. Rather, new laws may increase another type of
cost-the cognitive costs of decisionmaking. Essentially, more-
complicated legal regimes will create harder decisions for judges.
And judges, all else being equal, will tend to disfavor legal doc-
trines that make their decisions more difficult. This Section will
examine this effect in greater detail, with the goal of better un-
derstanding and predicting how judges will react to higher cog-
nitive decision costs.
Cognitive costs can be most easily understood as a measure
of mental fatigue. Mental fatigue typically involves subjective
feelings of tiredness or exhaustion, and it impairs cognitive per-
formance and increases stress.45 It can result from grappling
with a difficult or complex decision.46 People are averse to men-
tal fatigue and high expenditures of mental energy.47 Dealing
42 See text accompanying note 15.
43 See notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
44 For a discussion of law clerks' role in the judicial opinion-writing process, see
Richard A. Posner, Reflections on Judging 238-55 (Harvard 2013).
45 See generally G. Robert J. Hockey, Compensatory Control in the Regulation of
Human Performance under Stress and High Workload: A Cognitive-Energetical Frame-
work, 45 Biological Psychology 73 (1997); Bruce S. McEwen and John C. Wingfield, The
Concept of Allostasis in Biology and Biomedicine, 43 Hormones and Behav 2 (2003).
46 See generally Robert Langner, et al, Energetic Effects of Stimulus Intensity on
Prolonged Simple Reaction-Time Performance, 74 Psychological Rsrch 499 (2010).
47 See generally Hockey, 45 Biological Psychology 73 (cited in note 45).
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with complicated, multifactorial decisions can even activate the
emotional regions of the brain, causing anxiety and frustration. 48
The upshot is that people will tend to try to avoid difficult
mental calculations and will prefer decisions that require less
mental energy.49 They will also seek to avoid high cognitive costs
by choosing decision strategies that require low levels of effort.50
The application of this framework to judges is relatively straight-
forward. All else being equal, judges will prefer decisionmaking
regimes that require less mental energy and will disfavor regimes
that involve complex, mentally fatiguing decisions.
The simple principle that people seek to avoid mental fa-
tigue and high cognitive decision costs lies behind many of the
interesting findings of behavioral psychology and behavioral
economics. It drives our attraction to a variety of cognitive heu-
ristics and shortcuts. 51 And it can motivate people to select a de-
fault option, whatever that may be, rather than facing a difficult
choice.52 This default effect can also contribute to the tendency to
stick with a familiar status quo.53
Another behavioral phenomenon of particular relevance to
legal decisionmaking is known as anchoring. People faced with a
complex numerical task frequently start with a given number
(the "anchor") and then adjust up or down. This allows them to
avoid the demanding mental task of calculating a numerical an-
swer from scratch. The problem is that these adjustments are
typically insufficient, so final answers are biased in favor of the
initial anchor.54
This anchoring effect is powerful and pervasive. Even when
people are given numbers that they know to be arbitrary and
randomly selected, they tend to use those numbers as anchors.
48 See generally Sharon Begley, I Can't Think! The Twitterization of Our Culture
Has Revolutionized Our Lives, but with an Unintended Consequence-Our Overloaded
Brains Freeze When We Have to Make Decisions, Newsweek 28 (Mar 7, 2011).
49 See Barry Schwartz, The Paradox of Choice: Why More Is Less 125-32 (Harper-
Collins 2004).
50 See Maarten A.S. Boksem, Theo F. Meijman, and Monicque M. Lorist, Mental
Fatigue, Motivation and Action Monitoring, 72 Biological Psychology 123, 129 (2006).
51 See Richard H. Thaler and Cass R. Sunstein, Nudge: Improving Decisions about
Health, Wealth, and Happiness 19-31 (Yale 2008).
52 See, for example, id at 83-84.
53 See Part II.C.3.
54 See Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuris-
tics and Biases, 185 Science 1124, 1128 (1974); Thaler and Sunstein, Nudge at 23-24
(cited in note 51); Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining outside the Shadow of Trial, 117
Harv L Rev 2463, 2515-16 (2004).
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In one experiment, numbers selected by spinning a wheel acted
as anchors for participants asked to guess the percentage of Af-
rican countries in the United Nations. 55 The median estimate of
participants who randomly spun the number 10 was 25 percent,
while the median estimate from participants who randomly
spun the number 65 was 45 percent.56
In legal decisions that require numerical answers, judges
may anchor to given numbers, even if legal doctrine dictates
that they generate numbers independently. 57 Further, anchors
may be derived from past practices that were learned under an
overturned legal regime. If a previous doctrine produced stand-
ard numerical outputs (such as months of imprisonment for a
certain crime, or dollars of damages for a certain tort), a judge
may anchor to these figures in producing numerical outputs un-
der a new regime.58 In this way, overturned laws may continue
to have an influence even after their demise, in contravention of
the doctrinal commands of higher courts.
Thus far, this Part has addressed two effects that might mo-
tivate judges to resist legal change: resistance to increased time
and effort costs, and resistance to increased cognitive decision
costs. Of course, the same costs may be present even in the ab-
sence of legal change. The current legal standard, for instance,
might be particularly complex or difficult to apply compared to a
potential alternative standard. And indeed, some noncompliance
with long-standing, high-decision-cost laws is probable. But
there are several reasons why resistance to high-cost legal re-
gimes is likely to be most powerful in the context of legal
change.
First, a change in the law is likely to make the existence of a
feasible alternative more salient. Judges know that they could
be applying a simpler rule or standard because, before the
change, that is exactly what they were doing. Second, the fact
55 See Tversky and Kahneman, 185 Science at 1128 (cited in note 54).
56 Id. Payoffs for accuracy did not reduce the anchoring effect. See id.
57 See generally Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Andrew J. Wistrich, and Chris Guthrie, Can
Judges Make Reliable Numeric Judgments? Distorted Damages and Skewed Sentences,
90 Ind L J 695 (2015) (finding, in studies using hypothetical cases, that judges are sub-
ject to substantial anchoring effects in awarding damages and in sentencing).
58 See William Samuelson and Richard Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias in Decision
Making, 1 J Risk & Uncertainty 7, 22 (1988) (finding that later numerical decisions are
anchored to earlier numerical decisions, even when circumstances have changed). See
also Bibas, 117 Harv L Rev at 2515 (cited in note 54) (stating that legal actors may
anchor to previous, analogous cases).
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that a legal standard was used to determine case outcomes in
the past may lend it a legitimacy or authority that an untested
alternative doctrine lacks. Third, as mentioned above, the an-
choring effect might cause judges to resist change in areas in
which a previous legal regime produced concrete numerical out-
puts. Finally, there is another, powerful set of effects that can
alter judges' preferences. These effects-discussed in the next
Section-may cause judges to favor the legal status quo, inde-
pendent of whether a new doctrine would increase or decrease
decision costs.
C. Status Quo Preference Effects
Judges are regularly called on to apply, explain, and justify
(in writing) a given legal doctrine. They become accustomed to
working with the doctrine, and doing so becomes almost auto-
matic over time. They come to identify the doctrine as the status
quo and see any changes to it, however desirable, as departures.
With each of these steps, judges become more and more likely to
resist doctrinal changes and gravitate toward overturned, de-
funct laws-even in direct contravention of higher courts' doc-
trinal commands. This Section posits that biases in favor of fa-
miliar, status quo doctrines will shape judges' preferences and
affect their behavior.
1. Justification bias.
One of a judge's most important duties is applying legal doc-
trines to real-world disputes. Millions, even billions, of dollars
may be allocated to one party or the other on the basis of a
judge's ruling. Judges sentence criminal defendants to impris-
onment for decades or, in some jurisdictions, to death. In other
words, a judge's decisions can have profound consequences for
the lives of the men and women who appear before him.
Suppose that a judge is directed to apply a particular legal
doctrine, Doctrine X, in certain criminal cases. Doctrine X typi-
cally leads to certain types of nonviolent criminals being sent to
jail for twenty years, without the possibility of parole. Assume
that this judge is initially somewhat skeptical about the desira-
bility of Doctrine X. Nonetheless, he is doctrinally required to
apply it, and he accepts it as binding precedent. He duly applies
it in several cases, sentencing defendants to twenty years of
imprisonment.
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The judge is thus faced with something of an internal con-
tradiction: he is skeptical of the normative foundations of Doc-
trine X, but he must nonetheless use it to drastically alter the
life of a defendant, sentencing her to decades of confinement. It
is well established that people generally try to reduce such in-
consistencies between their actions and their beliefs, often by
changing their beliefs. 59 They tend to ignore or suppress infor-
mation that indicates that their past decisions are in error, par-
ticularly when being a good decisionmaker is an important part
of their self-image.60 It is very likely that judges conceive of
themselves as good decisionmakers, and that this is an im-
portant part of their identities. Over time, judges may increas-
ingly convince themselves of the normative correctness of the
doctrines that they have previously applied. This effect may in-
fluence judges to prefer the doctrinal status quo.
In addition, judges are likely influenced by the human ten-
dency to seek out information that confirms (rather than contra-
dicts) a given hypothesis. When people are given a proposition or
hypothesis, they tend to notice evidence that confirms rather
than disproves it.61 This applies even in cases when people have
no material stake in the proposition's veracity.62 A judge receiv-
ing a doctrinal mandate from a higher court is, to some degree,
given a proposition ("Doctrine X is the best interpretation of the
law") and told to act as though it is true. Under these circum-
stances, judges are more likely to seek out or notice evidence in-
dicating that the doctrine is optimal rather than evidence sug-
gesting that it is not. This may cause judges to believe that the
doctrinal status quo is justified, even if a neutral review of the
evidence would suggest otherwise.
There is an additional, unique reason why judges may be
especially susceptible to a bias in favor of a doctrinal status quo.
When people are asked to generate explanations for a proposi-
tion, they tend to express greater confidence in the truth of the
59 See Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1 J Risk & Uncertainty at 39 & n 21 (cited in
note 58); Derek J. Koehler, Explanation, Imagination, and Confidence in Judgment, 110
Psychological Bull 499, 508 (1991). See also generally Leon Festinger and James M.
Carlsmith, Cognitive Consequences of Forced Compliance, 58 J Abnormal & Soc Psychol-
ogy 203 (1959).
60 See Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1 J Risk & Uncertainty at 38-39 (cited in note 58).
61 See Raymond S. Nickerson, Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in
Many Guises, 2 Rev Gen Psychology 175, 176-78 (1998).
62 See id. Note that judges may have a stake in the correctness of the doctrine
here-they wish to avoid applying an erroneous doctrine.
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proposition.63 This is true even if they are told that the proposi-
tion is totally fabricated.64 It seems that the mere act of generat-
ing explanations reinforces a belief in the correctness of the
thing explained.65 And these explanations need not be causal
stories or detailed accounts; any attempt to generate reasons to
support a proposition is sufficient to produce the effect.66
Judges may be particularly vulnerable to this cognitive in-
fluence. Repeatedly explaining a doctrine, the history of its de-
velopment, or the higher court's reasons for adopting it is likely
to bias a judge in favor of that doctrine. These tasks are all but
unavoidable for most Article III judges.67
Combining these related effects, we can identify a bias that
I will refer to as "justification bias." Judges ordered to apply a
doctrine will be biased in favor of believing that the doctrine is
justified. The bias comes about because of the internal conflict
that judges may feel if the doctrine is unjustified, a tendency to
notice information that may justify the doctrine, and the re-
quirement that judges explain and rationalize the doctrine to
others. At a broader level, justification bias can affect any actor
in a position to adversely affect the lives of others through the
exercise of power, especially one who has strong motives to justi-
fy this harmful use of power to himself or others. Even if such an
actor is initially skeptical about the normative foundations of
the rules or norms that he enforces, he is likely, over time, to
come to believe in their correctness.
Further, justification bias is likely to manifest as judicial
hostility toward changes in law. Let us briefly return to our hy-
pothetical judge. Imagine that, ten years later, a higher court
overturns the case that established Doctrine X and develops
63 See Koehler, 110 Psychological Bull at 500 (cited in note 59).
64 Seeid at 501.
65 See id at 500.
66 See id.
67 Note that first drafts of many judicial opinions are written by judicial clerks, al-
beit often with substantial ex ante guidance from the judge. It is likely that a judge who
relies heavily on his clerks to write opinions would not be as strongly influenced by any
bias caused or amplified by repeatedly explaining a given doctrine. Nonetheless, even a
very clerk-dependent judge may be influenced as he revises or reworks a drafted opinion,
internalizing its language and reasoning and perhaps adding to it as well. These judges
might also regularly apply and justify doctrines during the course of hearings or oral rul-
ings, when they are less reliant on their clerks. Finally, judges sign their written opin-
ions and send them out into the world as their own work. This likely motivates judges to
believe that the doctrines on which their opinions rely are justified, even if much of the
opinion's language was the work of a clerk.
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Doctrine Y in its place.68 Under Doctrine Y, criminals who previ-
ously were sent to jail for twenty years without the possibility of
parole are now sent to jail for only five years, and with the pos-
sibility of parole. How is the judge likely to feel about Doctrine
Y? If he had come to believe that Doctrine X was normatively
desirable, he is more likely to believe that this new, different
doctrine is undesirable. Otherwise, he has been sentencing de-
fendants to extremely harsh sentences without normative justi-
fication. That would conflict with his image of himself as a good
decisionmaker and a just person. It would contradict the words
of numerous opinions and orders to which he has signed his
name. And it would create an inconsistency that could generate
substantial internal conflict.69 He may therefore develop a strong
preference for the old, overturned doctrine.
Empirically, once people reach a conclusion or form a belief,
they are often very resistant to change, even in the face of strong
evidence that the conclusion or belief is wrong.70 Initial impres-
sions tend to persist, even when the person is credibly told that
the impressions are based on arbitrary, imaginary, or false in-
formation.71 This resistance to change may occur at a subcon-
scious level. Initial beliefs or conclusions exert an influence even
when people try to ignore them while considering a new, alter-
native view.72
Moreover, people's tendency to persist in initial beliefs is
significantly enhanced when they are told to write an explana-
tion for those beliefs. 73 This implies that "the act of writing the
explanation itself can enhance the perseverance of discredited
beliefs."74
It is therefore likely that judges who come to favor an exist-
ing doctrine will be motivated to resist changes to that doctrine.
68 In this scenario, the higher court is presumably not as familiar with Doctrine X
and has not applied it to numerous defendants. Rather, it apparently sees what the
judge suspected at the start: Doctrine X is not normatively justified.
69 See Koehler, 110 Psychological Bull at 508 (cited in note 59); Samuelson and
Zeckhauser, 1 J Risk & Uncertainty at 39 (cited in note 58).
70 See Nickerson, 2 Rev Gen Psychology at 187 (cited in note 61). People also tend
to give information that is acquired first in time more weight in drawing conclusions
than information that is acquired later. Id.
71 See id.
72 See id at 203.
73 See Koehler, 110 Psychological Bull at 501 (cited in note 59). Further, if asked to
explain two things in sequence, people tend to persist in believing whatever they explain
first. See id at 503.
74 Id at 501.
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They may feel that the new doctrine is unjustified, or at least
less justified than the familiar doctrine that they have applied
so often. Judges might be unable to objectively consider a new
doctrine without being influenced by their initial beliefs. And,
having repeatedly explained and justified an existing doctrine,
judges may be reluctant to stop applying it, even if told by a
higher court that it was erroneous in the first place.
2. Routinization.
Even judges with a varied docket of cases encounter issues
that eventually become routine, often to the point of boredom.
Appellate judges may encounter a number of sentencing ap-
peals, or workplace-discrimination claims, that are factually
similar and decided in the same manner. Trial judges may deal
with a certain type of case common to their district, like oil-
rights disputes in Texas, corporate law cases in Delaware, or
prisoner litigation and products liability cases anywhere. And
specialized courts are especially likely to encounter identical or
similar cases.
Even when the facts (and outcomes) of these cases vary, the
legal doctrines that judges apply will often be the same, and fa-
miliar. A judge hearing her 500th slip-and-fall case is not taking
a fresh look at her jurisdiction's slip-and-fall precedents, nor is
she reaching new opinions about lingering controversies in that
body of law. She is applying the same doctrine in much the same
way that she has so often before.
Perhaps at first, a judge's application of a doctrine reflects
conscious reasoning and deliberate decisions. But people do not
go through a deliberate decisional process when they make the
same decision over and over again. 75 Rather, the decision may
become habitual and even automatic.76 One's conscious attitudes
and opinions become less important in dictating behavior, while
habits and past behavior become more important. 77 This effect is
powerful, and it is as likely to occur in important areas as in
trivial ones.7 8
75 See Henk Aarts, Bas Verplanken, and Ad van Knippenberg, Habit and Infor-
mation Use in Travel Mode Choices, 96 Acta Psycholgica 1, 2 (1997).
76 See id.
77 See id.
78 See Judith A. Ouellette and Wendy Wood, Habit and Intention in Everyday Life: The
Multiple Processes by Which Past Behavior Predicts Future Behavior, 124 Psychological Bull
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Intentions and opinions can themselves become habitual.79
When the same situation arises repeatedly, people can become
habituated to intending to perform an action and then perform-
ing it.80 Habits may also subtly influence preferences, as people
are likely to form favorable attitudes toward acts that they have
frequently performed in the past.8'
Thus, a judge applying a familiar doctrine for the 500th
time is likely to do so in a habitual manner, without engaging in
a fresh process of reasoning and deliberation about the doctrine.
This is not to say that judges are applying doctrines uncon-
sciously or absentmindedly, like they would brush their teeth.
But forming an intent to apply a doctrine can become almost au-
tomatic, 82 and applying the doctrine can become a matter of rou-
tine-one that does not engage a judge's full attention in the
way that a novel legal issue might.
Can the influence of routinization and habit cause judges to
resist doctrinal changes imposed by a higher court or legisla-
ture? Aphorists and neuroscientists agree that old habits are
hard to break,83 although sufficiently strong intentions can over-
ride habitual behavior. Through consistent mental control of be-
havior, people can avoid familiar actions until new behaviors be-
come ingrained.84
The assumption of the traditional model of legal change is
that judges are able to break their old habit of applying an over-
turned law almost immediately8 5 It is certainly reasonable to
assume that a judge will be made aware of any relevant higher-
court cases overturning old precedents or otherwise changing
the applicable doctrine. The judge herself may read about the
case, or she may hear about it from her fellow judges, her law
clerks, or the litigants. Once the legal change is brought to the
54, 54, 57 n 3 (1998) ("[F]requency of past behavior, a standard indicator of habit
strength, is the best predictor of future behavior.") (citation omitted).
79 See id at 65.
80 See id at 55. See also generally Henk Aarts and Ap Dijksterhuis, Habits as
Knowledge Structures: Automaticity in Goal-Directed Behavior, 78 J Personality & Soc
Psychology 53 (2000).
s1 See Ouellette and Wood, 124 Psychological Bull at 56 (cited in note 78).
82 See id at 65.
83 See generally, for example, Terra D. Barnes, et al, Activity of Striatal Neurons
Reflects Dynamic Encoding and Recoding of Procedural Memories, 437 Nature 1158
(2005).
84 See Ouellette and Wood, 124 Psychological Bull at 57, 70 (cited in note 78).
85 See text accompanying note 39.
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judge's attention, presumably the judge changes her behavior
accordingly.
But such behavioral changes may not be as easy as the tra-
ditional model assumes. Although a judge may intend to imple-
ment a new doctrine, her behavior may be more influenced by
the near-automatic habits that take over when she is faced with
a familiar fact pattern.8 6 Habits are difficult to break in part be-
cause they can change the structure of the brain itself.87
When faced with a familiar situation, these dormant brain
structures can reassert themselves, automatically triggering the
old habitual response.88 The upshot is that even judges who are
fully committed to obeying the new doctrine may be more prone
to "mistakes" when they have habitually applied a prior doc-
trine. That is, they may apply the now-overturned doctrine
without fully realizing that they are failing to follow a higher
court's doctrinal command. This is especially likely to occur
when judges are called on to make quick decisions during the
course of a trial or during a pretrial hearing. But it might even
occur in the context of written opinions.89
Such "mistakes" may also be more likely to occur when
judges have formed favorable attitudes toward habitually ap-
plied doctrines. In order to comply with a higher court's opinion
altering an applicable doctrine, not only must judges become
aware of the new opinion, but they must also read and under-
stand it. Because judges tend to favor the old, habitually applied
doctrine,90 they may be more prone to misinterpreting, minimiz-
ing, or even forgetting the opinion that overturned it. 91 This ef-
fect may be amplified by the other effects discussed in this Sec-
tion, which can cause judges to prefer existing doctrine and
disfavor doctrinal changes.
86 See Aarts, Verplanken, and van Knippenberg, 96 Acta Psycholgica at 2 (cited in
note 75) (suggesting that conscious attitudes "may become irrelevant in guiding behavior
when the behavior has been performed repeatedly, and has become habitual").
87 See generally Barnes, et al, 437 Nature at 1158 (cited in note 83).
88 See id; Michael Kanellos, MIT Explains Why Bad Habits Are Hard to Break
(CNET News, Oct 19, 2005), archived at http://perma.cc/63A4-UKQN.
89 See Parts III, W.A.
90 See text accompanying notes 81-82.
91 People's judgments are often strongly influenced by their preferences and hopes.
See, for example, Leonard S. Newman, Motivated Cognition and Self-Deception, 10 Psy-
chological Inquiry 59, 61-62 (1999).
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3. Uncertainty and the status quo.
a) Uncertainty aversion. As judges learn about and apply
a doctrine, it becomes more familiar to them. Over time, judges
come to know a doctrine's origins, the way it operates, its effects
on society, and its consequences for litigants. Changes in the law
typically present judges with a new and unfamiliar doctrine, the
practical effects of which are unknown and often difficult to pre-
dict. So alterations to the doctrinal status quo are likely, at least
at first, to increase the uncertainty that judges face in resolving
legal disputes.
Dealing with uncertain outcomes and ambiguous choices
can be uncomfortable, even painful, for decisionmakers. People
are more averse to uncertainty than a rational-choice model of
behavior would predict.92 That is, they will pay a substantial
premium to avoid dealing with an ambiguous choice, even when
doing so does not increase expected value. 93 Aversion to uncer-
tainty manifests at the most basic levels of cognition and can be
traced to specific neurological structures. Making decisions
when there is ambiguity activates areas of the brain associated
with disgust and pain and is correlated with lower activity in
areas associated with reward. 94
Uncertainty aversion is even stronger when people compare
an unfamiliar situation to a more familiar one. 95 And aversion
may be a particular problem when people are dealing with an is-
sue that calls for expertise that they do not possess. 96 By con-
trast, people with expertise in a certain area are likely to be less
averse to uncertainty within that area. 97
Again, these findings may apply to judicial practices. All
else being equal, judges are likely to be averse to a new doctrine
whenever they are uncertain of how the doctrine will operate in
practice, or unsure of its consequences for parties or its impact
92 See Craig R. Fox and Amos Tversky, Ambiguity Aversion and Comparative Igno-
rance, 110 Q J Econ 585, 585-86 (1995); Colin Camerer and Martin Weber, Recent Devel-
opments in Modeling Preferences: Uncertainty and Ambiguity, 5 J Risk & Uncertainty
325, 334 (1992).
93 See Camerer and Weber, 5 J Risk & Uncertainty at 333 (cited in note 92).
94 See Ming Hsu, Ambiguity Aversion in the Brain *20 (unpublished conference pa-
per, June 2004), archived at http://perma.cc/XF5R-HA47. See also generally Ming Hsu,
et al, Neural Systems Responding to Degrees of Uncertainty in Human Decision-Making,
310 Science 1680 (2005).
95 See Fox and Tversky, 110 Q J Econ at 588 (cited in note 92).
96 See id at 587.
97 See id.
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on society. This aversion to uncertainty and concomitant prefer-
ence for the familiar operates at the most fundamental cognitive
level and may have a powerful effect on behavior.98
b) Status quo bias. A related effect that may motivate
judges to resist doctrinal change is known as status quo bias.
When making decisions, people tend to select the status quo op-
tion, even when doing so does not maximize welfare.99 One rea-
son for this bias is that people tend to experience more feelings
of regret when they act and suffer bad consequences than when
they do nothing and suffer the same consequences. 100 Another is
that people facing challenging or complex decisions may have dif-
ficulty choosing between several alternatives according to their
true preferences, so they just default to the status quo.'0 ' Accord-
ingly, status quo bias tends to become stronger as the number of
choices increases or as tradeoffs become more difficult.102
Of course, when people strongly prefer a particular new
choice, the effect of status quo bias is diminished. 103 Judges
might have uniformly strong preferences for compliance with
new doctrines, and those preferences may allow them to mini-
mize the effects of status quo bias. And there is another reason
why we might not expect status quo bias to affect how judges re-
act to legal change: once an old rule is replaced with a new one,
the status quo itself should be changed. Judges might still think
of the old rule as the status quo option at first, but, assuming
that there are no substantial barriers to its adoption, the new
rule may rapidly come to constitute a new status quo.
Status quo bias may, however, still exert a substantial in-
fluence when the prior status quo remains a valid option under
the new law. For example, status quo bias is likely to influence
judges when a bright-line rule is replaced with a standard that
allows courts to reach the outcome produced by the old rule. In
these situations, judges may view the old rule as the status quo
98 See Camerer and Weber, 5 J Risk & Uncertainty at 333 (cited in note 92).
99 See, for example, Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1 J Risk & Uncertainty at 8 (cited
in note 58); Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch, and Richard H. Thaler, The Endowment
Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias, 5 J Econ Persp 193, 198 (1991). See also
Thaler and Sunstein, Nudge at 34 (cited in note 51).
100 See Russell Korobkin, Inertia and Preference in Contract Negotiation: The Psy-
chological Power of Default Rules and Form Terms, 51 Vand L Rev 1583, 1613-14 (1998).
101 See Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1 J Risk & Uncertainty at 25-26 (cited in note 58).
102 See id at 8; Amos Tversky and Eldar Shafir, Choice under Conflict: The Dynam-
ics of Deferred Decision, 3 Psychological Sci 358, 358, 361 (1992).
103 See Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1 J Risk & Uncertainty at 8 (cited in note 58).
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choice. They may use the old rule as a default, applying it when-
ever they have difficulty making an affirmative decision under
the new standard.104 Judges in such situations would likely
reach the old-rule outcome much more frequently than a nonbi-
ased judge would.
D. Toward a New Model of Judicial Compliance with Legal
Change
The foregoing sections have described a variety of costs,
preferences, and heuristics that may cause judges to disfavor
changes to existing legal doctrine. Many of these influences are
likely to operate on judges at a subconscious level. Nonetheless,
it is possible that judges are able to overcome even powerful
subconscious influences on their decisionmaking. Judges do typ-
ically have a strong sense of duty, an aversion to reversal, and a
desire to protect their professional reputations,105 all of which
might cause them to be on guard against even subtle biases and
effects.
This Article posits that judges actually will resist legal
change, even, at times, in defiance of doctrinal imperatives. In
other words, judges will engage in either indirect or direct non-
compliance in response to the influences identified above. There
are numerous grounds for this conclusion. Surveys of judges,
using questions designed to test for common cognitive illusions,
indicate that judges are susceptible to the same general mental
biases as other decisionmakers (including jurors).106 There is ev-
idence that increases in workload can affect appellate judges'
behavior, causing them to dissent less or to reverse fewer dis-
trict court decisions. 107 Further, resistance to change has been
observed in other professional contexts in which experts have
been slow to adopt new practices despite apparently compelling
104 See Tversky and Shafir, 3 Psychological Sci at 361 (cited in note 102). Default
rules can have very powerful effects on behavior, including the behavior of legal actors.
See generally Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83
Cornell L Rev 608 (1998); Thaler and Sunstein, Nudge (cited in note 51).
105 See text accompanying notes 13-15.
106 See Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, and Andrew J. Wistrich, Inside the Ju-
dicial Mind, 86 Cornell L Rev 777, 784, 829 (2001).
107 See Epstein, Landes, and Posner, The Behavior of Federal Judges at 283, 293
(cited in note 11) (explaining that as their workload increases, appellate judges are less
likely to dissent). See also generally Bert I. Huang, Lightened Scrutiny, 124 Harv L Rev
1109 (2011) (noting that increases in judicial workload affect circuit reversal rates).
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reasons to do so.108 And observations of judicial behavior in a va-
riety of areas suggest that judges have been influenced to resist
many types of legal change. 109
This Section further develops a new model of how judges re-
spond to doctrinal change and describes the situations in which
resistance to change is most likely to occur.
1. The basic framework.
The effects of the costs, biases, and preferences described
above will, this Article predicts, have a measurable impact on ju-
dicial compliance. This Section briefly summarizes these effects
and sets out a basic framework for modeling judicial resistance.
The first type of effect is judicial aversion to increased time
and effort costs. These are the costs of implementing a doctrine
that show up in opinion length, or in the time spent reading
briefs, researching a case, or carrying out some mandatory pro-
cedure. Judges will tend to prefer doctrines with lower imple-
mentation costs and will resist doctrines that impose higher
costs. When the law changes from a low-cost regime to a high-
cost one, the increase is likely to be especially salient to judges,
and they will be motivated to resist the change.
The second type of effect is judicial aversion to increased
cognitive decision costs. These are the internal costs of making
difficult, complex, or multifactorial decisions. They may, but
need not, show up in opinion length or time spent making a de-
cision. They are in fact most likely to manifest as increased
mental fatigue, confusion, or stress. Judges will tend to prefer
doctrines that keep these costs low. When the law changes from
a low-decision-cost to a high-decision-cost regime, judges will
feel the increased costs, and they will be influenced (often sub-
consciously) to resist the change.
Finally, the third type of effect is judges' tendency to devel-
op a preference for existing legal doctrines. This may be coupled
with an aversion to unfamiliar doctrines and their uncertain
108 For instance, doctors often fail to change their familiar practices in response to
new data or medical guidelines, even when they recognize the benefits of doing so and
even when failure to follow guidelines may expose them to tort liability. See generally,
for example, Cynthia G. Ayres and Hurdis M. Griffith, Perceived Barriers to and Facili-
tators of the Implementation of Priority Clinical Preventive Services Guidelines, 13 Am J
Managed Care 150 (2007); Timothy K. Mackey and Bryan A. Liang, The Role of Practice
Guidelines in Medical Malpractice Litigation, 13 Virtual Mentor 36 (2011).
109 See Part III.
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consequences. Unlike the first two effects, this effect is present
regardless of whether the new law increases or decreases deci-
sion and implementation costs. Judges will tend to prefer doc-
trines that they have applied and justified in the past, that are
routine or familiar, or that they consider to be the status quo or
default option. When the law changes, judges will, all else being
equal, prefer existing law to the new law and will be motivated
to resist the change.
2. Integration with existing models.
Of course, these are not the only variables that influence
how judges comply with new laws. The conventional model iden-
tifies several important considerations that affect judicial com-
pliance, including judges' dislike for being reversed, desire to
uphold their reputations, and acceptance of compliance as part
of the judicial role.11o The strength of these factors should not be
overstated,111 but surely they play a substantial role in deter-
mining judicial behavior. And they will shape how the three ef-
fects described above influence judges and cause resistance to
legal change.
The level of judicial resistance to legal change will be de-
termined in part by the probability that judges' noncompliance
will be detected and reproved. When judicial noncompliance is
likely to be noticed, and especially when it is likely to generate
some formal or informal penalty, it is less likely to occur. Thus,
defiance of a popular higher-court decision that has received
substantial media attention would be relatively improbable.
Noncompliance is more likely to occur when it is difficult to de-
tect or unlikely to be punished, as when a governing decision or
statute has received little or no public attention. For example, if
a judge purported to apply a new standard in an estate-law case
but in fact ignored the new law and simply did the same thing
that he has always done, the noncompliance might be difficult to
detect, and even if it were detected, the legal community, media,
and even higher courts might be less likely to reprimand him.112
The probability of detection, and the likelihood and magnitude
110 See text accompanying notes 13-15.
111 See note 13.
112 Higher courts with discretionary dockets would be especially unlikely to spend
the time necessary to police this kind of indirect noncompliance.
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of a penalty, are factors that help determine the incidence of ju-
dicial resistance to legal change.
The framework described above can also be integrated into
existing accounts of judicial compliance that consider political or
policy preferences. Essentially, judicial policy preferences act as
another variable in the calculus of judicial compliance. These
preferences may dampen or override the effects described above,
especially the effects of biases in favor of familiar doctrines. For
example, if judges have a strong political preference for a new
doctrine, the effects of status quo bias will be diminished. 113 Of
course, political preferences could just as easily amplify the ef-
fects described above, as when a judge has an ideological prefer-
ence for an existing doctrine that is replaced with a complex and
unfamiliar doctrine.
3. Generating predictions.
At this point, the model can be elaborated on and used to
generate predictions about how judges will respond to different
types of legal changes. When type 1 (time and effort costs), type
2 (cognitive decision costs), and type 3 (preference for familiar
doctrines) resistance effects are present, when the probability of
detection of resistance is low, and when judges' policy prefer-
ences do not strongly favor a new legal doctrine, judges are like-
ly to actively resist doctrinal changes through either indirect or
direct noncompliance. Whether noncompliance occurs in other
situations will depend on the presence of the variables and their
relative weight.
For instance, judges are likely to comply with doctrinal
changes if the resistance effects are absent or weak and the
probability of detection is high. On the other hand, if multiple
resistance effects are present and fairly strong, judges may en-
gage in noncompliance even when it is likely to be detected.
While the precise interactions of these variables may be dif-
ficult to predict, the model can generate several broad predic-
tions about judicial noncompliance. One is that, contrary to the
conventional model, noncompliance with legal change may occur
not only when lower court judges are ideologically opposed to a
higher-court ruling but also when they have no particular ideo-
logical preference. Another is that judicial noncompliance is
most likely to be observed in areas where it is unlikely to result
113 See text accompanying note 103.
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in substantial penalties for the disobedient judge, perhaps in ar-
eas that receive less popular attention or where noncompliance
is so common that it overwhelms the ability of appellate courts
to address it.
Ironically, this suggests that scholars looking for noncom-
pliance in controversial, highly publicized constitutional law
cases have been looking in exactly the wrong place. Although
controversy may indicate divergent political preferences, it also
encourages media and public attention, which makes noncom-
pliance less probable by increasing the chances of detection and
reputational harm. Noncompliance is more likely to be found
outside the glare of the media spotlight.
In addition, noncompliance with legal change is more likely
to occur when judges are called on to implement new laws in an
area in which they are familiar with the prior doctrine but lack
technical expertise.114 These nonexpert judges are likely to face
sharply increased time and effort costs as they try to teach
themselves unfamiliar science or mathematics relevant to the
new doctrine. Also, novices in a given area tend to be more
averse to uncertainty than experts making decisions in the same
area.115 Combined, these effects likely make nonexpert judges
especially hesitant to depart from familiar doctrines.
Judicial noncompliance is probably most likely when a
higher court replaces an existing bright-line rule with a legal
standard, especially a complex or ambiguous one. This type of
legal change would implicate all three types of resistance effects.
A complicated standard would cost more in terms of time and ef-
fort (more research, longer opinions, and so forth). The cognitive
decision costs of applying such a standard would be much high-
er. The application of the standard and the resulting outcomes
would be uncertain, in contrast to the familiar operation of the
old rule. And the old rule might be used as a sort of default
choice under the new standard, a workable status quo option
that judges can select when applying the standard itself would
be difficult.116
By contrast, very high rates of compliance with doctrinal
changes would be likely when the three types of resistance
114 At least, this is the case holding all else equal. Experts might be more likely than
novices to hold strong ideological preferences for certain outcomes within their areas of
expertise.
115 See text accompanying notes 96-97.
116 See note 104 and accompanying text.
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effects are absent. A new doctrine may not increase effort or de-
cision costs, for instance. Type 3 effects (preference for familiar
doctrines) may be minimized when a higher court's opinion is
very clear, the previous doctrine was in place for only a short
time, or doctrinal change is frequent or expected (for example, in
a still-evolving, common-law context). For example, the frequent
changes in libel law as it evolved throughout the 1960s and
1970s were associated with very high rates of compliance.117
III. EVIDENCE OF JUDICIAL RESISTANCE TO LEGAL CHANGE
This Part does not purport to offer definitive proof of the
model described above. Rather, it offers several observations
that support the model and suggest that its theoretical under-
pinnings are sound. Future research will be required to estab-
lish a conclusive empirical account of judicial compliance with
legal change. And finding clear empirical evidence about any
kind of legal change can be difficult for a variety of reasons, in-
cluding confounding variables, unavailability of relevant data,
and selection effects.
Selection effects refer to the tendency of the set of cases filed
and litigated to change when legal standards change, a phenom-
enon that can result in a lack of measurable change in plaintiff
win rates in litigated cases. Thus, the behavior of parties and
judges may change in response to a legal change, but the rate of
plaintiff victories at trial may remain the same.118 For this
Article, I have taken examples from areas where selection ef-
fects are likely to be absent or minimal (as in criminal sentenc-
ing), or where judicial resistance is explicit and can be directly
observed. In other areas, I have examined practitioner behavior
in addition to judicial behavior in order to determine whether
parties might be changing their litigation practices in response
to new laws, and I have excluded examples where selection ef-
fects appear to play a significant role in the apparent absence of
legal change.
Evidence of the resistance effects described above may be
hard to obtain for another reason: judicial noncompliance is
most likely to occur in situations in which it is difficult to
117 See, for example, Gruhl, 33 W Polit Q at 511 (cited in note 39) (describing high
levels of compliance with New York Times v Sullivan, 376 US 254 (1964)).
118 See, for example, Priest and Klein, 13 J Legal Stud at 4-5 (cited in note 8) (dis-
cussing how utility-maximizing decisions tend toward 50 percent win rates for each side,
regardless of the applicable legal rules).
[82:901
Judicial Resistance and Legal Change
detect. 119 If a new law allows for a variety of outcomes, for in-
stance, judges may engage only in indirect noncompliance with
it in order to lower the risk of detection. Their noncompliance
with the new doctrine can be difficult to distinguish from a mis-
take in interpretation or an overly narrow application of binding
law.120 Thus, in order to observe judicial noncompliance, it may
be necessary to look for either overt defiance or indirect non-
compliance that is subtle at the individual case level but appar-
ent in the aggregate.
This Part gathers evidence from several areas of law in
which judges have engaged in direct noncompliance or detecta-
ble indirect noncompliance. It also presents the results of an
original study of the influence of prior, abrogated law on the ju-
dicial application of the qualified immunity doctrine. These ex-
amples illustrate how the resistance effects identified in Part II
operate in real-world settings.
A. Campbell v Acuff-Rose Music and the Sony Presumption
As discussed above, judicial disobedience is most likely to
occur when a bright-line rule is replaced with a more ambiguous
or multifactorial standard. The Supreme Court made such a
change to copyright law in 1994, and substantial noncompliance
followed.
When someone owns a copyright in a creative work (such as
a television show), others generally cannot reproduce it, perform
it, or display it. 121 However, other people can make "fair use" of a
copyrighted work without infringing an owner's copyright.122 The
fair use doctrine is reflected in § 107 of the Copyright Act of
1976,123 which states that, when deciding whether a use is fair,
courts should consider:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether
such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educa-
tional purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in re-
lation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
119 See Part II.D.2.
120 See Part I.B.
121 See 17 USC § 106.
122 Examples of fair use include criticism, reviews, news reporting, teaching, and
scholarship. See 17 USC § 107.
123 Pub L No 94-553, 90 Stat 2541, codified as amended at 17 USC § 101 et seq.
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(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or
value of the copyrighted work.124
In the seminal 1984 fair use case Sony Corp of America v
Universal City Studios, Inc,125 the Supreme Court applied these
factors to the then-new technology of the Sony Betamax video
recorder, establishing the Court's modern approach to the fair
use doctrine. The majority opinion set forth a presumption: un-
der prong one of the fair use test, use of copyrighted material for
a "commercial or profit-making purpose" was presumptively un-
fair.126 Likewise, under prong four of the fair use test, if the use
was commercial, a likelihood of future harm to the copyright
holder was presumed.127 This "Sony presumption," though tech-
nically dicta,128 was applied by numerous lower courts deciding
fair use cases.129
The controversial presumption remained legally viable until
1994, when the Court directly struck it down in Campbell v
Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.13° The Sixth Circuit had applied the pre-
sumption to defendant Campbell's fair use claim for a parody
version of Roy Orbison's Oh, Pretty Woman. Finding that Camp-
bell had sold the parody commercially, the Sixth Circuit de-
clared the use unfair.131 The Supreme Court reversed, declaring
that courts must not use the presumption and emphasizing that
the proper fair use test requires consideration of all circumstanc-
es, to which no presumptions or per se rules should be applied. 132
Campbell "explicitly . .. repudiated the [Sony] presumption
and should have buried it once and for all."'133 The case made it
clear that commerciality was just one factor among many for
courts to consider.134 As Pierre Leval, a prominent Second Cir-
cuit judge and author of an influential paper on fair use, 35
124 17 USC § 107.
125 464 US 417 (1984).
126 Id at 449, 451.
127 See id at 451.
128 The Court determined that the use of the Betamax by Sony customers was non-
commercial. Id at 449.
129 See Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions,
1978-2005, 156 U Pa L Rev 549, 601, 619 (2008).
130 510 US 569 (1994).
131 Id at 573-74.
132 See id at 577, 583-85, 591.
133 Beebe, 156 U Pa L Rev at 601 (cited in note 129).
134 See id at 571-72.
135 See generally Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 Harv L Rev
1105 (1990).
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wrote: Campbell "fixed the rudder and restored the compass
bearing. It has dispelled ... the pernicious 'commercial use'
presumption."136
The possibility of direct judicial resistance to Campbell was
not considered. Under the conventional model, copyright was
unlikely to be sufficiently politically charged for lower courts to
defy a clear declaration from the Supreme Court. And even if it
was, such resistance would manifest itself as a biased interpre-
tation of the amorphous fair use standard, not direct defiance of
Campbell's commands.
Yet many judges continued to use the Sony presumption
long after Campbell, despite the Supreme Court's clear com-
mand. Specifically, 7.4 percent of all federal fair use opinions af-
ter Campbell (through 2005) continued to apply the defunct
Sony presumption to commercial use under the first prong of the
fair use test.137 This compares to 41.7 percent of all federal fair
use opinions that applied the presumption in the first prong pri-
or to Campbell.138 Campbell had an even less powerful impact on
lower court behavior under the fourth prong of the fair use
test-a difficult factor that requires judges without expertise in
marketing or product development to assess the effect of the de-
fendant's use on the potential market for a copyrighted work.
Prior to Campbell, 30.5 percent of federal fair use opinions ap-
plied the Sony presumption under prong four. After Campbell,
15.4 percent of federal fair use opinions continued to apply the
presumption under the fourth prong. 139 Thus, the application of
the Sony presumption under prong four decreased after Camp-
bell by only 49.5 percent, rather than the 99-100 percent that
conventional models would predict.
Campbell had a major effect on lower court behavior, as one
would expect from a binding Supreme Court opinion. But a sub-
stantial percentage of federal judges essentially ignored Camp-
bell and continued to apply a defunct, overruled, bright-line rule
rather than a new, more complex standard. This cannot be ade-
quately explained by conventional models of judicial compliance.
But it does comport with the model described in Part II.
136 Pierre N. Leval, Campbell v. Acuff-Rose: Justice Souter's Rescue of Fair Use, 13
Cardozo Arts & Enter L J 19, 22 (1994).
137 Beebe, 156 U Pa L Rev at 602 (cited in note 129). Unsurprisingly, most of these
cases resulted in a denial of the fair use claim.
138 Id at 601. Recall that the presumption is not applied to noncommercial uses.
139 Id at 619. Again, most of these cases resulted in denial of the fair use claim.
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Striking down the Sony presumption and commanding
courts to apply an ambiguous, multifactorial standard impli-
cates all three types of effects described above. A "case-by-case"
analysis that is "not to be simplified with bright-line rules"140
will tend to increase time and effort costs for judges and make
their decisions more cognitively taxing. Courts also may have
become familiar with and come to prefer the Sony presumption
during the decade between Sony and Campbell. The Supreme
Court directed judges to "explore[ ]" and weigh all four factors
(and any other relevant factors) against each other "in light of
the purposes of copyright."'1' Faced with such a challenging and
ambiguous task, judges may be tempted to use an old, familiar,
bright-line rule as a default choice.
This Article's model of judicial compliance would thus pre-
dict some significant level of resistance to Campbell's com-
mands. It would also predict that resistance to Campbell would
be greater when judges face a more difficult analysis, or an
analysis that calls for particular expertise.142 This is consistent
with the finding that judicial noncompliance with Campbell was
greater under the more complex prong four (the effect of use on the
potential future market for a copyrighted work) than under the
simpler prong one (the general purpose and character of the use).
B. Rules that Increase Time and Effort Costs
Judges are likely to resist new legal rules that would sub-
stantially increase time and effort costs. 143 Resistance to height-
ened costs can be exacerbated by the effect of habit and routiniza-
tion, as judges often form strong preferences in favor of their
existing modes of conduct.14 We are thus likely to observe non-
compliance with new, high-cost rules governing judicial behavior.
140 Campbell, 510 US at 577.
141 Id at 578. According to Leval, judges must engage in a "multifaceted assessment"
of the "dynamic interrelationship" of the fair use factors in order to properly apply the
fair use test. Leval, 13 Cardozo Arts & Enter L J at 22 (cited in note 136). Note also that
the fourth factor requires nonexpert judges to predict how infringement will affect future
markets for copyrighted items.
142 See note 114 and accompanying text.
143 See Part H.A.
144 See Part II.C.2.
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1. Jury-improvement rules.
Over the past twenty years, numerous states and federal
districts have established commissions to examine and improve
the functioning of jury service. These commissions have pro-
posed several new rules intended to enhance juror participation,
comprehension, and accuracy. They have endorsed practices like
allowing jurors to take notes and submit questions during trials,
encouraging jurors to discuss evidence before deliberations, in-
structing jurors on law and practice throughout the trial, and
providing jurors with written jury instructions for use during de-
liberation. Many of these practices have been formally mandated
in statutes, higher-court opinions, or court rules, or promoted in-
formally through judicial-education programs.145
Even when binding, the implementation of these rules has
been dependent on individual courts and judges and has rarely
arisen at the appellate level.146 Application of the rules was, in
other words, almost invisible to higher courts and the broader le-
gal community. In fact, little was known about their implementa-
tion until a 2007 survey that asked judges, lawyers, and court
officials about the jury practices used in their most recent trials. 147
The author of the study was surprised to find "judicial non-
compliance in jurisdictions that either mandated or expressly
prohibited certain practices."'14 This defiance of binding laws or
rules occurred for every type of jury-improvement rule. For in-
stance, in jurisdictions that mandated that jurors be instructed
before closing arguments, that law was disregarded in 30 per-
cent of civil trials. Where courts were required to give all jurors
written copies of the final jury instructions, the rule was not fol-
lowed in 52.8 percent of civil trials. In jurisdictions where juror
note taking was prohibited, it was nonetheless allowed in 41.7
percent of civil trials. And in jurisdictions that mandated in-
structing jurors on substantive law before trial begins, that law
was disregarded in a whopping 69.7 percent of trials. 149
To the survey author, this noncompliance amounted to "judi-
cial nullification" of the jury-improvement rules.150 It is certainly
145 See Paula L. Hannaford-Agor, Judicial Nullification? Judicial Compliance and
Non-compliance with Jury Improvement Efforts, 28 NIU L Rev 407, 408-12 (2008).
146 See id at 409, 413-14.
147 See id at 410-11.
148 Id at 409.
149 Hannaford-Agor, 28 NIU L Rev at 418-19 (cited in note 145).
150 Id at 421-23.
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a clear-and illustrative-example of judicial noncompliance. As
this Article's model would predict, noncompliance with manda-
tory jury-improvement rules was at its highest in areas in which
compliance with the rules would require additional time, effort,
or diligence. Many judges declined to take the time to instruct
jurors on substantive law at various points in the trial or failed
to provide written instructions for all jurors. On the other hand,
judicial noncompliance was observed for every kind of jury-
improvement rule, and often in both directions-some judges
failed to implement practices when they were mandatory, while
other judges used the same practices when they were prohibit-
ed.151 This suggests a substantial role for habit and routinization
of practices among judges, and a tendency among judges to de-
velop preferences in favor of existing practices. It also indicates
that these effects can sometimes be strong enough to cause
judges to resist adopting new legal rules even when doing so
would lower their time and effort costs. 152
2. The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act.
Class action lawsuits accusing officers of publicly held com-
panies of securities fraud are both lucrative and particularly
prone to abuse. Defendant corporations have strong incentives
(like preventing further declines in stock prices) to settle such
cases, even relatively meritless ones. As a result, unscrupulous
attorneys may bring questionable lawsuits in order to obtain
hefty settlements, even when doing so is not in the best interests
of most investors. 153
In response to this problem, Congress passed the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995154 (PSLRA), which es-
tablished several procedural hurdles meant to deter frivolous se-
curities lawsuits in federal court. It imposed heightened plead-
ing standards, regulated which parties could be named as lead
plaintiffs in class action suits, and required courts to conduct a
151 See id at 419.
152 For instance, in jurisdictions where instructing jurors on substantive law before
a trial was prohibited, judges did so anyway in 6.7 percent of cases. And where giving
written copies of jury instructions to jurors was forbidden, judges persisted in doing so in
18.3 percent of civil trials. Id.
153 See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Report of the Committee on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, S Rep No 104-98, 104th Cong, 1st Sess 6 (1995);
Michael A. Perino, Did the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act Work?, 2003 U Ill L
Rev 913, 920.
154 Pub L No 104-67, 109 Stat 737, codified in various sections of Title 15.
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review of whether attorneys had violated FRCP 11, which pro-
vides for sanctions against attorneys who bring frivolous or un-
warranted legal or factual claims. 155 This last procedural change
is the focus of this Section.
Section 21D(c) of the PSLRA provides that upon final adju-
dication of any private securities action, "the court shall include
in the record specific findings regarding compliance by each par-
ty and each attorney representing any party with each require-
ment of Rule 11(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as to
any complaint, responsive pleading, or dispositive motion.156
Courts must make findings as to whether the attorneys' plead-
ings and motions have been filed for an improper purpose,
whether their legal claims are warranted by existing law, and
whether their factual claims have evidentiary support.
This requirement is unambiguous and purely procedural.
Even in the unlikely event that a judge were averse to imposing
sanctions on a party filing frivolous lawsuits or making false
claims,157 he could simply find that the party's claims were in-
correct, but not entirely unwarranted. Failure to comply with
§ 21D's direct statutory command would be visible to reviewing
courts and would likely be very embarrassing to district court
judges if pointed out. Under the conventional model of judicial
compliance, one would expect total, or virtually total, compliance
with this statute. In fact, when President Bill Clinton vetoed the
PSLRA, he cited its new sanctions-review requirement, arguing
that it treated plaintiffs too harshly and would convert securi-
ties litigation into a "loser pays" system. 158 Congress overrode
Clinton's veto, and § 21D went into effect on December 22, 1995.
Although § 21D is clear, it sharply increases time and effort
costs to judges, requiring them to assess compliance by every
party and every attorney with each of the four requirements of
Rule 11(b), for every pleading or dispositive motion that parties
155 FRCP l1(b)-(c). For a brief summary and history of the PSLRA, see Neil Pandey-
Jorrin, A Case for Amending the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act: Why Increasing
Shareholders' Rights to Sue Will Help Prevent the Next Financial Crisis and Better In-
form the Investing Public, Bus L Brief 15, 15-17 (Spring 2009).
156 15 USC § 78u-4(c)(1). There is identical language in § 27 of the Act, codified at 15
USC § 77z-1(c)(1). Hereinafter, for clarity, references to "§ 21D" encompass this section
as well.
157 If a judge finds a violation of Rule 1 1(b), he is required to impose sanctions under
15 USC § 78u-4(c)(2).
15s See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Veto Message from the Pres-
ident of the United States, HR 1058, 104th Cong, 1st Sess, in 141 Cong Rec H 15214
(daily ed Dec 20, 1995).
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file. It may also increase cognitive decision costs for judges, re-
quiring them to assess the purpose of every filing and consider
whether novel legal claims are warranted under existing law.159
And it commands judges to change from conducting Rule 11 in-
quiries in rare cases and only on motion from the parties or their
own initiative,160 as they had done their entire judicial careers,
to conducting numerous Rule 11 inquiries for every pleading or
motion filed in every securities case.
The few existing studies of the frequency with which judges
conduct Rule 11 inquiries under § 21D indicate that compliance
with § 21D is far from total-in fact, it is quite rare. One study
of § 21D's effects examined a set of 1,039 final orders in securi-
ties cases and found that only 140, or 13.5 percent, actually
complied with § 21D.161 Moreover, the vast majority (125 out of
140) of "compliant" orders were approvals of settlement agree-
ments that contained boilerplate statements that no Rule 11 vio-
lations had occurred.162 Another study of the effects of the
PSLRA found that only 50 cases (out of hundreds filed) had ad-
dressed Rule 11 sanctions under the PSLRA in the first nine
years after its enactment. 163 The authors concluded that
"[d]espite the recurring use of adjectives like 'mandatory,' 'spe-
cific,' and 'each' in the statute, "the sanction provision has been
little used as a weapon against possibly abusive class actions.164
Examining a large set of PSLRA cases on Westlaw points to
a similar conclusion. As of August 1, 2011, 1,493 federal opin-
ions mentioned the PSLRA along with an entry of judgment or
dismissal with prejudice.165 Of these, only 93 mentioned Rule 11
sanctions under the PSLRA, a rate of 6.2 percent.166 This is not
159 See FRCP 11(b).
160 See FRCP 11(c).
161 M. Todd Henderson and William H.J. Hubbard, Do Judges Follow the Law? An
Empirical Test of Congressional Control over Judicial Behavior *13 (Coase-Sandor Insti-
tute for Law and Economics Working Paper and Public Law and Legal Theory Working
Paper, Jan 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/N8GF-WB5M.
162 Id at *17-18.
163 Stephen J. Choi and Robert B. Thompson, Securities Litigation and Its Lawyers:
Changes during the First Decade after the PSLRA, 106 Colum L Rev 1489, 1508 (2006).
164 Id.
165 I searched Westlaw's ALLFEDS database for "pslra & (ent! /3 judgment) 'final
judgment' (dismis! /s 'with prejudice')."
166 For the set of 1,493 cases, I used the same methodology as Professors Stephen
Choi and Robert Thompson to search for cases that mention sanctions. See Choi and
Thompson, 106 Colum L Rev at 1508 n 117 (cited in note 163) (reporting the results of a
search for "sanctions & PSLRA & 'Rule 11"'). A slightly different methodology of examining
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conclusive, but it suggests that judges are not conducting the
statute's mandatory sanctions inquiries in the vast majority of
cases decided under the PSLRA. Judges appear to be defying the
direct statutory requirement of § 21D en masse.
More-concrete evidence can be obtained by examining the
few appellate cases that actually address the sanctions provision
of § 21D. I located only twenty-nine of these cases decided before
August 1, 2011.167 In twelve of these twenty-nine, the appeals
court admonished the district court for failing to comply with the
statute and remanded so that the court could make the required
Rule 11 findings.16 In another twelve, district courts made find-
ings as to sanctions following a final judgment, but only after a
party moved for sanctions-something that would not have been
necessary had the courts complied with the statute by address-
ing sanctions sua sponte. In only five of the twenty-nine cases
did the lower court conduct a sanctions inquiry, as contemplated
by the statute.
Even in the set of district court cases addressing § 21D,
there is evidence of direct noncompliance with the statute's
commands. I randomly selected fifty district court cases that
dealt with § 21D. Nineteen of the fifty cases addressed sanctions
only on the motion of a party after a final adjudication.169 In
these cases, the courts failed to comply with the statute because
they dismissed the case or entered judgment without conducting
any sanctions inquiry. A party later pointed out this failure and
reminded the court to conduct the required inquiry.170
securities cases on Westlaw yielded a rate of 3.2 percent compliance with § 21D. See
Henderson and Hubbard, Do Judges Follow the Law? at *29 n 46 (cited in note 161).
167 I searched Westlaw's ALLFEDS database for "sanctions & pslra & 'rule 11' &
da(bef 8/1/2011)" and "78u-4(c) or 77z-1(c) & da(bef 8/1/2011)." This yielded forty-one ap-
pellate cases, twenty-nine of which actually address § 21D.
168 See, for example, Rombach v Chang, 355 F3d 164, 178 (2d Cir 2004) ("Neither
the district court's Memorandum and Order nor its judgment made the required Rule 11
findings .... (W]e remand to the district court for compliance with the PSLRA."); Cohen
v USEC, Inc, 70 Fed Appx 679, 689 (4th Cir 2003) ("[T]he district court ... fail[ed] to
make Rule 11(b) findings expressly required by the [PSLRA]. . .. Because the statute
commands that such findings be made, we remand this case for that purpose."); Gurary v
Winehouse, 190 F3d 37, 47 (2d Cir 1999) ("[T]he district court made no findings regard-
ing compliance with Rule 11(b). As the statute required the district court to make find-
ings, we have no choice but to remand in order to permit it to do so.").
169 In another six cases, a party moved for judgment and sanctions at the same time.
170 See, for example, In re Initial Public Offering Securities Litigation, 399 F Supp
2d 369, 370 (SDNY 2005); Furlong v Appiant Technologies, Inc, 2005 WL 1463490, *1
(ED Mo); Gorman v Coogan, 324 F Supp 2d 171, 172 (D Me 2004).
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This Section does not purport to calculate an exact percent-
age of cases adjudicated under the PSLRA in which judges do
not comply with the clear command of § 21D. But the percentage
is not zero or near zero, as conventional models would predict. In
fact, judges appear to defy § 21D in a very high proportion of
PSLRA cases. Such extensive defiance of a controlling statute is
initially quite surprising, even shocking. However, for the
reasons discussed earlier, 171 this result comports with this Arti-
cle's model of judicial compliance.
C. eBay v MercExchange and Indirect Noncompliance
The above sections address situations in which courts are
faced with clear doctrinal imperatives and failure to comply is
easy to observe. In these contexts, the conventional model would
predict total or near-total compliance by courts. As such, the ex-
amples of noncompliance discussed above provide direct evi-
dence supporting this Article's model of judicial resistance. The
following sections discuss situations in which noncompliance is
more widespread but also less overt and more difficult to detect.
In these circumstances, evidence for the new model may take
more-subtle forms, such as the persistent influence of an over-
turned law, and the concomitant failure of a new law to substan-
tially change lower court behavior. Such examples may indicate
that judges are resisting a legal change and gravitating toward
a familiar, defunct doctrine.
The aftermath of the Supreme Court's 2006 patent case
eBay Inc v MercExchange, LLC172 offers an interesting example
of indirect resistance to a major doctrinal change. Prior to eBay,
the Federal Circuit had established a rule that, absent excep-
tional circumstances, a patent holder who proves that another
party has infringed her patent should be granted a permanent
injunction against the infringer.173 Denials of permanent injunc-
tions were accordingly rare. No rigorous empirical studies have
171 See text accompanying notes 159-60.
172 547 US 388 (2006).
173 See MercExchange, LLC v eBay, Inc, 401 F3d 1323, 1339 (Fed Cir 2005). See also
Richardson v Suzuki Motor Co, 868 F2d 1226, 1247 (Fed Cir 1989). Exceptional circum-
stances in this context refer to situations in which a permanent injunction would cause
significant harm to the public interest, as in patent cases involving medical technologies
not otherwise available.
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been completed, but estimates of the pre-eBay rate of approval of
preliminary injunctions range from 84 to 95 percent.174
In eBay, the Supreme Court unanimously rejected the Fed-
eral Circuit's bright-line rule for granting injunctions. Instead,
the Court held that permanent injunctions could issue only after
a court had applied the traditional four-factor equitable test for
permanent injunctions. The test requires a court to consider four
factors and balance competing interests. To obtain an injunction,
a plaintiff must demonstrate:
(1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that reme-
dies available at law ... are inadequate to compensate for
that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of hardships
between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is
warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be dis-
served by a permanent injunction.175
The Court also expressly warned against taking shortcuts to
avoid a thorough, painstaking application of the test. Although
the district court had applied the appropriate four-factor test, 176
the Supreme Court noted that its application of the test was er-
roneous, because it had essentially formulated a "categorical
rule" that a patent holder's failure to market its patented prod-
uct means that it has suffered no irreparable harm from in-
fringement.177 Such a shortcut was forbidden, the Court ruled,
because "traditional equitable principles do not permit such
broad classifications.178
The Supreme Court's unequivocal command that lower
courts comprehensively apply the four-factor injunction test in
patent cases was perceived as a major change in patent law-
one with the potential to diminish the value of patents by bil-
lions of dollars. Patent observers predicted a "sea change"179 in
patent practice, a legal shift "of great consequence to both patent
174 See, for example, Lily Lim and Sarah E. Craven, Injunctions Enjoined; Remedies
Restructured, 25 Santa Clara Computer & High Tech L J 787, 798 & n 74 (2009); Robert
M. Isackson, After 'eBay,'Injunctions Decrease, Natl L J S1, S1 (Dec 3, 2007).
175 eBay, 547 US at 391.
176 See MercExchange, LLC v eBay, Inc, 275 F Supp 2d 695, 711 (ED Va 2003).
177 eBay, 547 US at 393.
178 Id.
179 Jeremy Mulder, The Aftermath of eBay: Predicting When District Courts Will
Grant Permanent Injunctions in Patent Cases, 22 Berkeley Tech L J 67, 67 (2007).
20151
The University of Chicago Law Review
owners and the infringers they confront."180 Some commentators
worried that it could jeopardize the entire patent system by erod-
ing incentives to seek patents or litigate against infringers.181
The reality of eBay's impact has been much different. Faced
with a command to apply a complex, four-factor equitable stand-
ard, courts instead appear to use the exact "categorical rule"
shortcut that the Supreme Court expressly forbade in its opin-
ion. 82 That is, courts deciding whether to award permanent in-
junctions have relied heavily on whether patent holders market-
ed their inventions.183 An injunction was virtually inevitable in
cases in which patent holders practiced their patents, but courts
nearly always denied injunctive relief to patent holders whom
the courts found were inactive in the relevant market.184
Although eBay rejected "broad classifications" based on practicing
patents, district courts appear to be using a "binary inquiry"-
market participation or no market participation-rather than
the four-factor test.185 Meanwhile, factors such as the type of pa-
tent, the overall complexity of the product, the likelihood of fu-
ture patent infringement, and even willfulness (which typically
weighs heavily in the decision to grant an injunction) have
played little or no role in determining whether an injunction will
issue.186
The widespread use of this "categorical rule" shortcut also
appears to have dampened eBay's impact on the rate of perma-
nent injunction awards. Studies of patent infringement cases
decided in the years following eBay found little change in the
180 C.J. Alice Chen and Darren E. Donnelly, eBay v. MercExchange: Supreme Court
to Reconsider Injunction Remedy in Patent Cases *1 (Fenwick & West LLP, 2006), ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/C9Z6-A378.
181 See Stacy Streur, The eBay Effect: Tougher Standards but Courts Return to the
Prior Practice of Granting Injunctions for Patent Infringement, 8 Nw J Tech & Intell
Prop 67, 67 (2009) (citing several commentators).
182 eBay, 547 US at 393.
183 See Streur, 8 Nw J Tech & Intell Prop at 72-79 (cited in note 181).
184 See Benjamin H. Diessel, Note, Trolling for Trolls: The Pitfalls of the Emerging
Market Competition Requirement for Permanent Injunctions in Patent Cases Post-eBay,
106 Mich L Rev 305, 318-21 (2007); Benjamin Petersen, Note, Injunctive Relief in the
Post-eBay World, 23 Berkeley Tech L J 193, 197-99 (2008) (noting that the court issued
an injunction in thirteen out of sixteen district court cases in which there was competi-
tion in the same marketplace).
185 See eBay, 547 US at 393; Diessel, Note, 106 Mich L Rev at 309, 315 (cited in
note 184).
186 See Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, The Aftermath of Ebay v MercExchange, 126 S.
Ct. 1837 (2006): A Review of Subsequent Judicial Decisions, 89 J Patent & Trademark
Office Society 631, 655-57 (2007); Diessel, Note, 106 Mich L Rev at 316-18 (cited in
note 184).
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rate of permanent injunctions granted to patent holders, while
practitioners and commentators noted the absence of a signifi-
cant impact on patent practice and the tendency of many district
courts to grant permanent injunctions as a matter of course in
most cases, just as they had done before eBay.187 One study cal-
culated that the rate of permanent injunctions granted in 175
post-eBay cases finding patent infringement through April 2011
remained high, at over 75 percent; 88 other studies have found
similar results.89 Although the doctrine had changed substan-
tially, there "has not been a corresponding shift in the outcome
of [patent injunction] decisions.19
Practitioners and scholars, following the conventional model
of judicial compliance, expected that eBay would cause lower
court judges to apply the traditional four-factor test for injunc-
tions and to issue injunctions at a substantially lower rate. In-
stead, lower courts appear to have adopted a binary approach,
granting injunctions as a matter of course to patent holders
found to be active in the marketplace and denying injunctions to
entities found not to have practiced their inventions-an ap-
proach specifically rejected by eBay.
The advent of this judicial shortcut was by no means inevi-
table or easily predictable. But this Article's model may offer an
187 See, for example, Andrei Iancu and W. Joss Nichols, Balancing the Four Factors
in Permanent Injunction Decisions: A Review of Post-eBay Case Law, 89 J Patent &
Trademark Office Society 395, 403 (2007); Isackson, After 'eBay,' Injunctions Decrease,
Natl L J at S1 (cited in note 174).
188 See Ronald J. Schutz and Patrick M. Arenz, Non-practicing Entities and Perma-
nent Injunctions Post-eBay, 12 Sedona Conference J 203, 205 (2011).
189 See Streur, 8 Nw J Tech & Intell Prop at 73-74, 79-80 (cited in note 181) (find-
ing an injunction grant rate of 75 percent from May 2006 through April 2009); Douglas
Ellis, et al, The Economic Implications (and Uncertainties) of Obtaining Permanent In-
junctive Relief after eBay v. MercExchange, 17 Fed Cir Bar J 437, 441-42 & nn 35-36
(2008) (finding that permanent injunctions were granted in about 78 percent of patent
infringement cases from May 2006 through July 2008).
190 Streur, 8 Nw J Tech & Intell Prop at 67 (cited in note 181). Note that the absence
of substantial change in the rates of permanent injunctions granted cannot be explained
by selection effects. There is no indication from practitioners' commentary on eBay that
they have changed their filing or litigation behavior; indeed, the conventional wisdom
seems to be that judicial behavior has remained unchanged and eBay has had little prac-
tical impact. See text accompanying note 187. There has been no detectable effect on the
number of patent applications filed or the number of patent suits initiated, both of which
increased (consistent with the general trend) in the years after eBay. See Patent Tech-
nology Monitoring Team, U.S. Patent Statistics Chart Calendar Years 1963-2011 (US
Patent and Trademark Office, July 24, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/Z6M6-HJRC;
Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research, Federal Court Cases: iate-
grated Data Base, 2009 (University of Michigan, 2009), archived at http://perma.cc/
XV7B-VF4B.
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explanation for this strange form of noncompliance with control-
ling Supreme Court precedent. Lower courts attempting to apply
eBay are confronted with a complex equitable inquiry, involving
difficult-to-analyze factors such as the feasibility of potential
damages and projected future damages over the life of the pa-
tent, the specific product or product component patented, the
technological area involved, the complexity of the invention, and
the willfulness of the infringement. It is, no doubt, powerfully
tempting to short-circuit this process and engage in an analysis
with dramatically lower decision costs and time and effort costs:
Is the patent holder marketing this invention? Courts appear to
be using this heuristic regularly instead of applying the required
four-factor test.
D. United States v Booker and Anchoring
For most of American history, federal judges have had broad
discretion to sentence criminal offenders. 191 Federal criminal
statutes have typically specified only a maximum term of im-
prisonment and a maximum fine, entrusting the judge to impose
an individualized sentence for each offender.192 But eventually
judges' unfettered discretion, and the uncertainty and dispari-
ties in sentences that it produced, led many to call for a more
consistent and uniform sentencing regime. 193 The issue reached
the halls of Congress when Senator Edward Kennedy introduced
what would become the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984.194 The
Senate Judiciary Committee cited numerous studies indicating
that judges varied greatly in terms of their sentencing goals,
their attitudes about punishment and retribution, and the
lengths of sentences that they imposed.195 One study conducted
by the US Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New
York gave twenty case files drawn from actual cases to fifty fed-
eral judges in the Second Circuit and asked them to sentence
each defendant. These identical cases yielded remarkably wide
sentencing ranges-from 3 years of imprisonment to 20 years
(extortion), 1 year to 10 years (sale of heroin), and probation to
191 See Kate Stith and Steve Y. Koh, The Politics of Sentencing Reform: The Legisla-
tive History of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 28 Wake Forest L Rev 223, 225 (1993).
192 See id.
193 See id at 226-30.
194 Pub L No 98-473, 98 Stat 1987, codified as amended at 18 USC § 1351 et seq.
195 See Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1983, Report of the Committee on the
Judiciary, S Rep No 98-225, 98th Cong, 1st Sess 41 (1983).
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7.5 years (theft and possession of stolen goods)-with a great
deal of variation in between.196 A similar, broader study for the
DOJ presented 16 cases of bank fraud or robbery to 208 active
federal judges. Variations were even greater, ranging from pro-
bation to 27 years of imprisonment for fraud, and probation to
25 years of imprisonment for bank robbery, with standard devia-
tions of up to 7.9 years.197 Judges' sentencing preferences ap-
peared to vary widely; some judges were found to sentence par-
ticular offenses more harshly than the norm, while others were
especially punitive when a defendant had a prior criminal
record. 198
The Sentencing Reform Act addressed these issues primari-
ly through the creation of the US Sentencing Commission, which
was tasked with producing Sentencing Guidelines that would
"ensure that similar offenders, committing similar offenses,
would be sentenced in a similar fashion."'199 Congress made the
Guidelines mandatory, although judges could depart from the
guidelines range if they could identify an aggravating or miti-
gating circumstance not contemplated by the Guidelines.200 The
Act also stipulated (with a few exceptions) that the maximum
sentence in a range could be at most 25 percent greater than the
minimum sentence. 201 The Sentencing Commission promulgated
the first set of binding Guidelines in 1987.
Judges were not pleased. Most had opposed the Act in the
first place.202 Many felt that the Guidelines were too rigid and
undermined the art of judging.23 This antipathy toward the
Guidelines may have influenced the approximately 200 district
court judges who initially declared the Guidelines unconstitu-
tional (compared to about 120 judges who upheld them);204 the
196 See id at 42-43.
197 See id at 44-45.
198 See id at 44.
199 Orrin G. Hatch, The Role of Congress in Sentencing: The United States Sentenc-
ing Commission, Mandatory Minimum Sentences, and the Search for a Certain and Ef-
fective Sentencing System, 28 Wake Forest L Rev 185, 189 (1993).
200 See 18 USC § 3553(b).
201 28 USC § 994(b). Exceptions to the 25 percent rule were made for maximum sen-
tences no more than six months greater than minimum sentences, and for maximum
sentences of life imprisonment.
202 See, for example, Stith and Koh, 28 Wake Forest L Rev at 257, 275 (cited in
note 191).
203 See Robert Weisberg, How Sentencing Commissions Thrned Out to Be a Good
Idea, 12 Berkeley J Crim L 179, 186-87 (2007).
204 Terence Dunworth and Charles D. Weisselberg, Felony Cases and the Federal
Courts: The Guidelines Experience, 66 S Cal L Rev 99, 113 n 56 (1992).
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Guidelines were, however, ultimately upheld by the Supreme
Court.205
Under the Guidelines, sentences greatly increased in severi-
ty. The percentage of federal defendants receiving probation de-
creased from nearly 50 percent to less than 15 percent.206 The
average sentence length for all crimes went from twenty-eight
months before the Guidelines to fifty months afterward, and ac-
tual time served increased from an average of thirteen months
to forty-three months.207 Sentence disparity was significantly re-
duced, reflecting the Guidelines' profound reduction in judicial
discretion.208
The Guidelines had been in force for the better part of two
decades when the Supreme Court issued a decision that called
their validity into question. In Blakely v Washington,29 the
Court concluded that a state's mandatory sentencing guidelines
violated the Sixth Amendment's jury trial guarantee because
they allowed judges to increase a defendant's sentence based
solely on judge-found facts.210 Less than one year later, the Court
held the federal Guidelines unconstitutional on the same reason-
ing in United States v Booker.211 But the Court did not strike
down the entire federal sentencing scheme. Rather, it fashioned
a unique remedy, striking only the provision that made the
Guidelines mandatory and a related provision for strict appel-
late review of sentences outside the Guidelines range, 212 and rul-
ing that all sentences (whether inside or outside the range)
would be reviewed for unreasonableness. It also left in place the
law requiring judges to calculate a Guidelines range, although
that range was made merely advisory.213
Booker was widely considered to be a paradigm shift in fed-
eral sentencing, a return to the pre-Guidelines era of broad judi-
cial discretion and dramatically lower federal sentences. The
Guidelines would "cease to restrain the discretion of federal
205 See generally Mistretta v United States, 488 US 361 (1989).
206 Kate Stith and Jos6 A. Cabranes, Fear of Judging: Sentencing Guidelines in the
Federal Courts 62 (Chicago 1998).
207 Id at 63.
208 See generally, for example, James M. Anderson, Jeffrey R. Kling, and Kate Stith,
Measuring Interjudge Sentencing Disparity: Before and after the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, 42 J L & Econ 271 (1999).
209 542 US 296 (2004).
210 Id at 303, 305.
211 543 US 220 (2005).
212 See 18 USC § 3742(e).
213 See Booker, 543 US at 259-60.
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judges,"214 who would "sentence defendants however they saw
fit."215 The decision "almost inevitably [would] reintroduce the
unjust sentencing disparities that plagued pre-Guidelines sen-
tencing."216 And overall, the "result [was] certain to be a return"
to the pre-Sentencing Reform Act era.217 The principles of Book-
er and Blakely were described as legal "earthquakes,"218 "bomb-
shell[s],219 and among the most important doctrinal changes in
the history of criminal law.220 They represented an "enormous
sea change for sentencing policy, perhaps even a revolution."221
But Booker's impact on judicial behavior has been dramati-
cally less than predicted. Judges, who had once been strongly
opposed to the Guidelines and the loss of discretion that they
represented, did not return to the days of lower sentences, pro-
bation-only sentences, or widely varied punishments. Practition-
ers and observers noted the "surprisingly limited"222 and "strik-
ingly modest"223 differences in sentencing practices following
Booker, concluding that "little has changed."224 The "Guidelines
continue to be applied as the default benchmark for sentencing"
in nearly every criminal case, 225 and "average and median
214 Id at 285 (Stevens dissenting).
215 D. Michael Fisher, Striking a Balance: The Need to Temper Judicial Discretion
against a Background of Legislative Interest in Federal Sentencing, 46 Duquesne L Rev
65, 78 (2007).
216 Julie R. O'Sullivan, The Federal Criminal "Code" Is a Disgrace: Obstruction
Statutes as Case Study, 96 J Crim L & Crimin 643, 725 (2006).
217 Booker, 543 US at 300 (Stevens dissenting).
218 Shannon P. Duffy, Blakely Makes Apprendi a Mere Tremor; But Pa. Guidelines
Not Likely in Jeopardy, 231 Legal Intelligencer 3, 3 (July 1, 2004).
219 Tefft W. Smith, James H. Mutchnik, and Scott M. Abeles, Harder to Prosecute? A
Recent Supreme Court Decision Could Nullify Enhanced Antitrust Penalties, 27 Legal
Times 1, 1 (July 12, 2004).
220 See Kevin R. Reitz, The New Sentencing Conundrum: Policy and Constitutional
Law at Cross-Purposes, 105 Colum L Rev 1082, 1086 (2005).
221 Jennifer L. Mnookin, Uncertain Bargains: The Rise of Plea Bargaining in Ameri-
ca, 57 Stan L Rev 1721, 1736 (2005). See also Graham C. Mullen and J.P. Davis, Manda-
tory Guidelines: The Oxymoronic State of Sentencing after United States v. Booker, 41 U
Richmond L Rev 625, 625 (2007).
222 William H. Sloane and Kenneth S. Levine, Booker' after a Year: New Highs for
Sentences, Guidelines Followed; Outside Counsel, NY L J 1, 1 (Mar 6, 2006).
223 Frank 0. Bowman III, The Year of Jubilee ... or Maybe Not: Some Preliminary
Observations about the Operation of the Federal Sentencing System after Booker, 43
Houston L Rev 279, 319 (2006).
224 Mullen and Davis, 41 U Richmond L Rev at 625 (cited in note 221).
225 James R. Dillon, Doubting Demaree: The Application of Ex Post Facto Principles
to the United States Sentencing Guidelines after United States v. Booker, 110 W Va L
Rev 1033, 1089 (2008).
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sentences nationwide are at historic highs, the exact opposite of
what was expected.226
Although many anticipated a flood of below-Guidelines sen-
tences following Booker, reflecting a return to the far-lower av-
erage sentences that prevailed before the Guidelines took effect,
it has not materialized. The Sentencing Commission calculated
that the rate of below-range sentencing increased from 8.6 per-
cent of all sentences in the pre-Booker era to 12.5 percent in the
first year after Booker.227 This was certainly a noticeable in-
crease, but hardly a revolution, especially in absolute terms.
(Neither was the increase in above-range sentences, from rough-
ly 0.8 percent to 1.6 percent.)228
The rate of downward departures then decreased slightly in
2006 and 2007, to 12.0 percent, before increasing gradually in
the years since (13.4 percent in 2008, 15.9 percent in 2009, 17.8
percent in 2010, and 17.4 percent in 2011).229 For every year
since Booker, the vast majority of sentences have continued to
fall within the Guidelines range.230
But even these numbers likely overstate the extent to which
federal judges changed their sentencing practices post-Booker.
First, although judges are departing from the Guidelines
226 Sloane and Levine, NY L J at 1 (cited in note 222).
227 The Commission intentionally used data predating the passage of the PROTECT
Act of 2003, Pub L No 108-21, 117 Stat 650, which limited district courts' ability to de-
part downward from the Guidelines and mandated de novo review for sentences outside
the range. The PROTECT Act's effects are difficult to quantify, and the Act was quickly
made irrelevant by Blakely and Booker. See Final Report on the Impact of United States
v. Booker on Federal Sentencing *77 (US Sentencing Commission, Mar 2006) ("USSC
Final Report 2006"), archived at http://perma.cc/C8PD-XG9J.
228 USSC Final Report 2006 at *58 (cited in note 227).
229 See, for example, U.S. Sentencing Commission Final Quarterly Data Report: Fis-
cal Year 2011 *1 (US Sentencing Commission, Mar 27, 2012) ("USSC Report Fiscal Year
2011"), archived at http://perma.cc/75CH-DD72. The corresponding numbers for above-
Guidelines sentences are: 1.6 percent in 2006, 1.5 percent in 2007 and 2008, 2.0 percent
in 2009, and 1.8 percent in 2010 and 2011. U.S. Sentencing Commission Final Quarterly
Data Report: Fiscal Year 2010 *1 (US Sentencing Commission, Apr 18, 2011), archived at
http://perma.cc/6P9A-YXNX; U.S. Sentencing Commission Final Quarterly Data Report:
Fiscal Year 2009 *1 (US Sentencing Commission, Mar 11, 2010), archived at
http://perma.cc/9EUD-V9F9; U.S. Sentencing Commission Final Quarterly Data Report:
Fiscal Year 2008 *1 (US Sentencing Commission, 2009); U.S. Sentencing Commission
Final Quarterly Data Report: Fiscal Year 2007 *1 (US Sentencing Commission, Mar 19,
2008), archived at http://perma.cc/W6EG-SVNM; U.S. Sentencing Commission Final
Quarterly Data Report: Fiscal Year 2006 *1 (US Sentencing Commission, Mar 16, 2007)
("USSC Report Fiscal Year 2006"), archived at http://perma.ccY6VK-KAKM.
230 See, for example, USSC Report Fiscal Year 2011 at *1 (cited in note 229). This is
the case whether or not government-initiated downward departures for substantial as-
sistance or other reasons are included.
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somewhat more often, their departures have been smaller (per
departure, on average) than pre-Booker departures.231 Two-
thirds of downward departures between Booker and 2006 were
less than 40 percent below the Guidelines minimum sentence,
suggesting that even departing judges were heavily influenced
by the Guidelines.22 And a return to pre-Guidelines probation
practices appears to be a pipe dream; rates of probation actually
decreased following Booker.233 The upshot of all this is that the
average sentence imposed post-Booker has very closely tracked
the average Guidelines minimum sentence, just as it did before
Booker.234 In fact, the average sentence slightly increased after
Booker, as the average Guidelines recommendation slightly in-
creased.235 This is, indeed, the "exact opposite of what was
expected."236
Second, the evidence suggests that judges continue to rely
heavily on the precise numbers generated by the Guidelines
when calculating sentences. Before Booker, judges set roughly
59 percent of all within-range sentences at the exact bottom of
the Guidelines range, and 10 percent at the exact top of the
range. After Booker, this behavior continued virtually un-
changed-judges set 58 percent of all within-range sentences at
the exact bottom of the range, and 10 percent at the exact top.237
In a great proportion of cases decided post-Booker, judges appear
to be simply adopting one of the Guidelines' numbers as their
"presumptive sentence.238
Why do the Guidelines retain so much force now that they
are advisory only? And why are they followed so often, despite
judges' traditional opposition to rigid sentencing regimes and
prior preference for far lower sentences? There are surely sever-
al reasons, but the evidence points to a prominent role for type 2
(cognitive decision cost) and type 3 (status quo favoring) effects.
Judges appear to be using the now-advisory Guidelines as an-
chors239 when they make their sentencing decisions. This allows
231 See USSC Final Report 2006 at *47, 63-64, 66 (cited in note 227).
232 See id at *47.
233 See id at *63.
234 See id at *70; USSC Report Fiscal Year 2011 at *32 (cited in note 229) (showing
the average sentence moving in virtual lockstep with the average Guidelines minimum).
235 See, for example, USSC Final Report 2006 at *69-73 (cited in note 227).
236 Sloane and Levine, Booker after a Year, NY L J at 1 (cited in note 222).
237 USSC Final Report 2006 at *72 (cited in note 227).
238 Id at *73.
239 See text accompanying notes 54-58.
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them to avoid the difficult task of coming up with a sentence
from scratch, but it has the effect of tying them tightly to the
Guidelines.240 The anchoring effect is most obvious in the cases
in which judges simply set a sentence identical to the numbers
at the top or bottom of the Guidelines range. But it is also ap-
parent in the smallness of the departures from the Guidelines-
even when judges depart, they appear to mentally begin with
the Guidelines range and then adjust slightly upward or down-
ward from there.241
Type 3 effects likely play a major role in judges' tolerant at-
titude toward the Guidelines, which they or their predecessors
once vehemently opposed. Between the Sentencing Reform Act
and Booker, Guidelines sentences became the status quo, and
judges applied and justified them repeatedly. This likely con-
tributes to judges' continued acceptance of drastically higher av-
erage terms of imprisonment (and lower rates of probation)
compared to the pre-Guidelines era. Further, the delayed and
very gradual increase in below-range sentences is consistent
with the slowly decreasing force of type 3 effects over time.
The behavior of individual judges following Booker also
suggests a prominent role for type 3 effects. A recent study has
found that judges appointed during the pre-Booker era were sig-
nificantly less likely to depart from the Guidelines after Booker
than judges appointed in the post-Booker era.242 Judges appoint-
ed before Booker routinely followed the then-mandatory Guide-
lines, and those judges persisted in following the Guidelines
even after they were no longer mandatory. These findings are
consistent with the theory that type 3 effects are causing judges to
gravitate toward older practices with which they are familiar-
such as closely following sentencing Guidelines--even after the le-
gal regime governing their behavior has changed substantially.243
Another reason for the continuing influence of the Guide-
lines may be that appeals courts have signaled that they will af-
firm nearly all sentences that fall within a Guidelines range. For
240 See Nancy Gertner, What Yogi Berra Teaches about Post-Booker Sentencing, 115
Yale L J Pocket Part (2006), archived at http://perma.cc2BYP-9QFL.
241 See text accompanying notes 58, 231-35.
242 See Crystal S. Yang, Have Inter-judge Sentencing Disparities Increased in an
Advisory Guidelines Regime? Evidence from Booker, 89 NYU L Rev 1268, 1318-19 (2014)
(noting that judges appointed before Booker are less likely to depart downward or up-
ward than judges appointed after Booker, and that this difference is statistically signifi-
cant for both types of departure).
243 See Part I.C.
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most of the period prior to Booker, neither defendants nor the
government could appeal sentences within a range.244 Sentences
outside a range were reviewed for abuse of discretion.245 Booker
allowed for appeals of within-range sentences and made clear
that all sentences were henceforth to be reviewed for "unreason-
able[ness].246 This particular change not only altered the long-
standing and familiar practice of reviewing only outside-
Guidelines sentences but also commanded courts to take the
time to perform a reasonableness review-a complex inquiry
based on the bevy of esoteric factors listed in 18 USC § 3553(a)-
on a vast swath of within-range sentences challenged by defend-
ants. As this Article's model would predict, appellate courts ap-
peared to resist this doctrinal shift. Most circuit courts quickly
created a "presumption of reasonableness" for any sentence fall-
ing within a Guidelines range. 247 This presumption was almost
never rebutted; the fact that a sentence was within the Guide-
lines practically ended the matter.248 And even in those circuits
that did not adopt the presumption, virtually every within-
Guidelines sentence was upheld on appeal.249 As a result, district
court judges may be motivated to sentence within the Guidelines
to avoid any risk of reversal.
However, it is unlikely that fear of vacatur by an appellate
court is the primary reason for the Guidelines' continued influ-
ence. The likelihood of a district court's outside-Guidelines sen-
tence being vacated as substantively unreasonable is extremely
low. Take 2006, for example, when there were 8,507 below-
Guidelines sentences, and 1,129 above-Guidelines sentences. 250
A comprehensive study of all sentencing appeals from January
1, 2006, to November 16, 2006, found that only 60 below-range
244 See 18 USC § 3742(a)-(b).
245 See Koon v United States, 508 US 81, 99-100 (1996).
246 Booker, 543 US at 261.
247 The Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Tenth, and DC Circuits adopted the
presumption, while the First, Second, Third, and Eleventh Circuits rejected it. See Rita v
United States, 551 US 338, 346 (2007) (listing cases). The Supreme Court eventually
ruled that appeals courts (though not district courts) could adopt the presumption with-
out violating the Sixth Amendment. Id at 351-54.
248 See Brief of New York Council of Defense Lawyers as Amicus Curiae in Support
of Petitioner, Rita v United States, No 06-5754, *5 (US filed Dec 18, 2006) (available on
Westlaw at 2006 WL 3742254) ("NYCDL Brief') ("Only one sentence out of 1,152 within-
guidelines sentences challenged on appeal for reasonableness has been found to be sub-
stantively unreasonable."). All 138 below-Guidelines sentences challenged by defendants
were affirmed. Id at *6 n 6.
249 See id at *5.
250 USSC Report Fiscal Year 2006 at *16 (cited in note 229).
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sentences (and only 7 above-range sentences) were vacated as
unreasonable.51 Adjusting the 2006 numbers to the 10.5-month
period of the study, and assuming an even distribution over
those months,252 the rate of vacatur of below-range sentences
was 0.8 percent, and the rate of vacatur of above-range sentenc-
es was 0.7 percent. Such a low risk of vacatur is unlikely to keep
district court judges up at night. Moreover, in surveys and em-
pirical studies, fear of reversal has not been shown to be a major
determinant of judicial behavior.253 Finally, several states in
which state sentences are essentially unreviewable on appeal
report high rates of conformity with voluntary state sentencing
guidelines. 254 Voluntary guidelines were especially influential in
states where judges were required to calculate the advisory
range before sentencing.255 This suggests that anchoring to given
numbers, rather than fear of reversal on appeal, is the primary
driver of advisory-guideline compliance.
E. Pearson v Callahan: Old Habits Die Hard
When type 3 (status quo favoring) effects are strong enough,
judges may resist a change to a familiar doctrine even when the
change would lower decision costs. This may occur, for instance,
when judges have routinely applied and justified a prior doctrine
over a number of years. A recent Supreme Court decision on
qualified immunity offers an opportunity to examine this kind of
resistance. Indeed, the volatile history of qualified immunity law
reveals a great deal about how judges respond to different types
of legal change.
251 NYCDL Brief at *la-2a (cited in note 248).
252 Assuming a roughly consistent distribution of cases, there were approximately
7,444 below-range sentences and 988 above-range sentences in the 10.5-month study
period.
253 See note 13. See also, for example, Richard A. Posner, How Judges Think 71
(Harvard 2008) ("[R]eversal aversion is rarely a very powerful motivator since a reversal
usually imposes only a small cost on the judge who is reversed."); William I. Kitchin,
Federal District Judges: An Analysis of Judicial Perceptions 90-92 (Collage 1978) (dis-
cussing judicial risk perceptions and attitudes toward reversal).
254 See USSC Final Report 2006 at *C-13 to -15 (cited in note 227). See also general-
ly John F. Pfaff, The Continued Vitality of Structured Sentencing Following Blakely: The
Effectiveness of Voluntary Guidelines, 54 UCLA L Rev 235 (2006).
255 See USSC Final Report 2006 at *C-15 (cited in note 227).
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1. Saucier and judicial defiance.
Government officials who have been sued for conduct within
the scope of their authority are entitled to qualified immunity.
That is, even if they have violated a plaintiffs constitutional (or
statutory) right, they are immune from suit unless the right was
clearly established at the time of the violation.256 Initially, the
Supreme Court did not specify exactly how courts should assess
qualified immunity: Should they always determine if there was
a violation of a right before examining whether the right was
clearly established? Or could they avoid the often-difficult
violation inquiry by simply concluding that the right was not
clearly established and therefore immunity applies? In the ab-
sence of a clear command, lower courts frequently took the
shortcut, declaring that immunity applied without determining
whether a constitutional violation had actually occurred.27
Then, in 1991, the Court in Siegert v Gilley258 admonished a
court of appeals for reaching a related qualified immunity ques-
tion-whether malicious intent by an officer was sufficiently
pleaded-before first resolving the "preliminary" issue whether
there had been a constitutional violation.29 The Court stated
that a "necessary concomitant to the determination of whether
the constitutional right asserted by a plaintiff is 'clearly estab-
lished' at the time the defendant acted is the determination of
whether the plaintiff has asserted a violation of a constitutional
right at all."260 The Court then affirmed on the ground that the
plaintiff had in fact failed to allege a violation of a constitutional
right.
The Court's opinion was not entirely clear because the case
involved malice pleading, the lower court was affirmed, and the
opinion did not expressly state that finding constitutional viola-
tions before addressing qualified immunity defenses was man-
datory. Still, panels in almost every circuit interpreted Siegert to
mean that the violation question must always be answered
first.261 But later panels often ignored these decisions, and, as a
256 See Harlow v Fitzgerald, 457 US 800, 818 (1982).
257 See, for example, Greg Sobolski and Matt Steinberg, Note, An Empirical Analysis
of Section 1983 Qualified Immunity Actions and Implications of Pearson v. Callahan, 62
Stan L Rev 523, 529, 554 (2010) (collecting empirical studies).
258 500 US 226 (1991).
259 Id at 232.
260 Id.
261 See Sobolski and Steinberg, Note, 62 Stan L Rev at 556 & n 116 (cited in note
257) (collecting cases).
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whole, appellate courts took the qualified immunity shortcut
only moderately less often than they had before Siegert-down
from approximately 38 percent of the time before the decision to
about 28 percent after.262
This reluctance to aggressively apply Siegert is not especial-
ly surprising-the opinion directed courts to take an approach
that would require substantially more time and effort and force
courts to confront thorny constitutional issues, and it had done
so in an oblique and halfhearted manner.
In 2001, however, the Court handed down Saucier v Katz,263
ruling that "the requisites of a qualified immunity defense must
be considered in proper sequence," which means that, "the first
inquiry must be whether a constitutional right [was] violated."264
It repeated this command several times in the opinion265 and jus-
tified it by pointing out the necessity of clarifying the law for fu-
ture cases. 26 The process for analyzing qualified immunity was
now unmistakable.
Several empirical studies were conducted after Saucier, and
each found something unexpected: numerous courts defied Sauc-
ier and continued to dismiss cases on qualified immunity
grounds without addressing whether a constitutional violation
had occurred. Remarkably, many of these courts would cite
Saucier but then appear to forget or ignore it just a few pages
later.267 The most comprehensive studies calculated that this de-
fiance occurred in 5.9 percent of all appellate and 5.1 percent of
all district court cases involving qualified immunity.268
The authors were understandably puzzled by the "continued
appearance of these outcomes even after the Court's Saucier
pronouncement" and reported that "our data do not shed light on
why lower courts would ignore the Saucier regime; there are no
discernable similarities among these claims (for example circuit,
262 See id at 554.
263 533 US 194 (2001).
264 Id at 200.
265 See, for example, id at 201 ('This must be the initial inquiry.").
266 Id.
267 See generally, for example, Caldarola v Calabrese, 298 F3d 156 (2d Cir 2002);
Franklin v Fox, 312 F3d 423 (9th Cir 2002); Gomez v Atkins, 296 F3d 253 (4th Cir 2002).
268 See Sobolski and Steinberg, Note, 62 Stan L Rev at 544 (cited in note 257) (track-
ing appellate courts' defiance of Saucier); Nancy Leong, The Saucier Qualified Immunity
Experiment: An Empirical Analysis, 36 Pepperdine L Rev 667, 711 (2009) (tracking dis-
trict courts' defiance of Saucier from 2006 to 2007). See also Thomas Healey, The Rise of
Unnecessary Constitutional Rulings, 83 NC L Rev 847, 937-47 (2005) (finding Saucier
defiance in 7 percent of appellate cases from 2001 to 2003).
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judge, or type of constitutional question.).269 This "intriguing"270
noncompliance, however, fits well with this Article's model of ju-
dicial behavior, which would predict that courts are likely to re-
sist a new doctrine that substantially increases time and effort
costs and departs from long-standing practice.
2. Status quo bias and resistance to legal change.
Eight years after Saucier, the Court made another major
change to qualified immunity law. In Pearson v Callahan,271 the
Court expressly overruled Saucier, recognizing that its rigid se-
quencing requirement had resulted in a "substantial expendi-
ture of scarce judicial resources on difficult questions. 272 Hence-
forth, it would be left to lower courts to "exercise their sound
discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified
immunity analysis should be addressed first. 273
Pearson was, in a sense, a total victory for lower courts,
which could now avoid the hassle of the Saucier regime and ex-
ercise unfettered discretion over how to resolve constitutional
claims in qualified immunity cases. Not since the period before
Siegert had lower courts had such freedom to avoid difficult con-
stitutional questions in qualified immunity cases.
A conventional account of judicial behavior would anticipate
that, after Pearson, judges would resume dismissing constitu-
tional claims solely on immunity grounds at roughly the same
rate as they did before Siegert.274 But this Article's model sug-
gests a more complicated picture. Because Pearson allows courts
to decrease their time and effort costs and avoid making difficult
decisions about constitutional liability, we might expect courts
to enthusiastically discard Saucier sequencing. But a type 3 re-
sistance effect (status quo favoring) is likely to play a role here,
making courts more likely to stick with the old, familiar Saucier
sequence, even though it is no longer required.
Saucier sequencing was in place for eight years, and quali-
fied immunity issues arise frequently in the federal courts.275 As
269 Sobolski and Steinberg, Note, 62 Stan L Rev at 546 (cited in note 257).
270 Id.
271 555 US 223 (2009).
272 Id at 224. See also id at 236-37 (collecting examples).
273 Id at 236.
274 See Sobolski and Steinberg, Note, 62 Stan L Rev at 555-56 (cited in note 257).
275 Saucier was cited in over 6,800 federal cases before Pearson was issued, includ-
ing in over 1,500 federal appeals.
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judges applied Saucier in case after case, the application of the
sequence may have become habitual, and therefore more likely
to persist.76 Judges also may have altered their preferences in
favor of Saucier sequencing, a result of the natural tendency to
develop favorable attitudes about past actions.277 In addition,
judges applying Saucier typically explained the case and often
justified its mandatory sequencing as necessary to "provid[e] a
clear standard against which officers can measure the legality of
future conduct."278 Having validated the doctrine, judges are
more likely to come to truly believe in it, or at least to prefer it
more than they otherwise would.279 Finally, Saucier sequencing
may operate as a sort of default choice for judges who do not
have strong preferences about sequencing in a given case. In the
absence of a compelling reason to deviate from past practice,
these judges may simply opt for the status quo.280
This Article's model would therefore predict that judges
would not revert to pre-Siegert rates of taking the qualified im-
munity shortcut. Judicial behavior is likely to change, but the
prior legal regime of mandatory sequencing is likely to continue
to influence judges via type 3 effects. In other words, the model
predicts that judges would dismiss cases on immunity grounds
at a higher rate than during the Saucier era but substantially
less than during the previous (pre-Siegert) era of unfettered
discretion.
To test this prediction, I compared the rate of immunity-
only dismissals in court of appeals cases decided after Pearson
with the rates observed pre-Pearson. In the two years following
Pearson, roughly 490 court of appeals cases cited the opinion.
Two hundred of these cases were randomly selected for this
study.281 Because some cases involved multiple claims, these 200
cases produced 224 distinct rulings on qualified immunity.
276 See Part II.C.2.
277 See text accompanying note 81.
278 Loria v Gorman, 306 F3d 1271, 1281 (2d Cir 2002). See also, for example, Wilson
v City of Boston, 421 F3d 45, 53 (1st Cir 2005) ("[C]ourts must address the constitutional
merits question first in order to facilitate the development of the law."); Doe v Heck, 327
F3d 492, 509 (7th Cir 2003) ("We proceed in this fashion because this analytical frame-
work promotes clarity in the legal standards for official conduct, to the benefit of both the
officers and the general public.") (quotation marks omitted).
279 See Part 1I.C.1.
280 See Part II.C.3.b.
281 A random-number generator was used. Cases that did not involve a qualified
immunity determination were later excluded.
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Using the same methodology as prior studies,282 these cases were
coded by outcome. The results are reported in the bottom rows of
Tables 1 and 2.
TABLE 1. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY CASE OUTCOMES IN COURTS OF
APPEALS
Before After Siegert,
Siegert before Saucier
After Saucier,
before Pearson
Court Finds NoCor id o26.5% 37.7% 43.6% 51.8%
Constitutional Violation
Court Finds a
Constitutional Violation 31.9% 28.6% 36.5% 30.0%
and No Qualified Immunity
Court Finds a
Constitutional Violation 3.6% 5.5% 13.9% 4.5%
but Still Grants
Qualified Immunity
Court Dismisses the Case
on Qualified Immunity 38.0% 28.1% 5.9% 13.8%
Grounds Alone
Note: All pre-Pearson numbers are from Sobolski and Steinberg, Note, 62 Stan L Rev
at 546, 552 (cited in note 257).
TABLE 2. THE QUALIFIED IMMUNITY SHORTCUT, OVER TIME, IN
COURTS OF APPEALS
Percent Dismissed
on Qualified
Immunity Alone
Before Siegert 38.0%
After Siegert, before Saucier 28.1%
After Saucier, before Pearson 5.9%
After Pearson
(Conventional Model Prediction)
After Pearson (Actual) 13.8%
Courts took the qualified immunity shortcut at a markedly
higher rate than they did under the mandatory Saucier-
sequencing regime-an increase from 5.9 percent to 13.8 per-
cent.28 3 But as this Article's model would predict, 13.8 percent is
282 See Sobolski and Steinberg, Note, 62 Stan L Rev at 540-43 (cited in note 257).
283 Another study of post-Pearson outcomes produced a similar rate, 19.5 percent.
See Ted Sampsell-Jones and Jenna Yauch, Measuring Pearson in the Circuits, 80 Ford-
ham L Rev 623, 628 (2011). However, that study's coding method did not account for
multiple rulings in a single case, and it therefore cannot be directly compared to the
comprehensive pre-Pearson studies.
After
Pearson
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much lower than the 38.0 percent observed during the previous
era of unfettered discretion.284 Courts' behavior under the new
discretionary regime appears to be substantially affected by the
prior, now-defunct legal doctrine. Even an unambiguously over-
turned legal doctrine like Saucier sequencing can have a major
influence on judicial behavior, because of type 3 effects.
The same phenomenon can be observed in district court cas-
es. Using the same methodology as a prior study of district
courts, 285 200 qualified immunity cases decided between March
1, 2012, and March 1, 2013, were randomly selected and coded
by outcome.28 6 Because some cases involved multiple claims,
these 200 cases produced 272 distinct rulings on qualified im-
munity. The results of the coding are reported in the bottom
rows of Tables 3 and 4.
284 The difference is statistically significant at the 1 percent level.
285 See Leong, 36 Pepperdine L Rev at 684-88 (cited in note 268). This was essen-
tially the same methodology used in Sobolski and Steinberg, Note, 62 Stan L Rev at 540-
43 (cited in note 257).
286 A random-number generator was used. Cases that did not involve a qualified
immunity determination were later excluded.
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TABLE 3. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY CASE OUTCOMES IN DISTRICT
COURTS
Before After Siegert,
Siegert before Saucier
After Saucier,
before Pearson
Court Finds NoCor id o42.2% 46.0% 61.4% 64.3%
Constitutional Violation
Court Finds a
Constitutional Violation 32.3% 32.7% 14.4% 25.7%
and No Qualified Immunity
Court Finds a
Constitutional Violation 3.7% 4.9% 3.6% 1.5%
but Still Grants
Qualified Immunity
Court Dismisses the Case
on Qualified Immunity 18.6% 13.3% 5.1% 8.5%
Grounds Alone
Note: All pre-Pearson numbers are from Leong, 36 Pepperdine L Rev at 711 (cited in
note 268). Professor Nancy Leong also coded a number of cases as "other," including
cases in which the court found a constitutional violation but did not address qualified
immunity (no such cases were encountered in this Article's sample) and in which the
court noted a clearly established right but found no constitutional violation (such cas-
es were coded for this Article as "court finds no constitutional violation"). See id at
687-88.
TABLE 4. THE QUALIFIED IMMUNITY SHORTCUT, OVER TIME, IN
DISTRICT COURTS
Percent Dismissed
on Qualified
Immunity Alone
Before Siegert 18.6%
After Siegert, before Saucier 13.3%
After Saucier, before Pearson 5.1%
After Pearson
(Conventional Model Prediction)
After Pearson (Actual) 8.5%
Courts took the qualified immunity shortcut at a somewhat
higher rate than they did under the mandatory Saucier sequenc-
ing regime, an increase from 5.1 percent to 8.5 percent. But as
this Article's model would predict, the 8.5 percent rate is far
lower than the 18.6 percent rate observed the last time judges
had complete discretion to use the shortcut.287 Again, courts'
behavior under a new legal regime appears to be greatly influ-
enced by an old, overturned law.
287 The difference is statistically significant at the 1 percent level.
After
Pearson
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The data collection for district court outcomes allows for an
additional test of this Article's predictions. This Article's model
implies that judges appointed to the bench after a doctrinal
change will be more inclined to adopt the new doctrine than
judges who served while the prior doctrine was in force.288 New
judges should not be as susceptible to type 3 effects-including
justification bias, routinization, or status quo bias-as judges
who have regularly applied the old doctrine.
To test this prediction using the district court sample, I
compared the decisions of judges appointed to the federal bench
before Pearson with the decisions of those appointed after Pear-
son.289 Of the 272 coded rulings on qualified immunity, 225 were
made by judges appointed before Pearson and 47 by judges ap-
pointed afterward.90 The outcomes are reported in Table 5.
TABLE 5. THE QUALIFIED IMMUNITY SHORTCUT IN DISTRICT
COURT CASES DECIDED 3/1/2012 TO 3/1/2013, BY ERA OF
JUDICIAL APPOINTMENT
Percent Dismissed on
Qualified Immunity
Alone
Conventional Model Prediction 18.6%
All Judges 8.5%
Judges Appointed before Pearson 6.7%
Judges Appointed after Pearson 17.0%
As discussed above, judges took the qualified immunity
shortcut at a far lower rate than the conventional model would
predict, using it in only 8.5 percent of cases. This effect appears
to be almost entirely driven by judges who served on the bench
during the Saucier era. Only 6.7 percent of these judges' rulings
on qualified immunity used the qualified immunity shortcut. For
the other 93.3 percent, these judges declined to take the shortcut
and instead followed the no-longer-mandatory, but familiar,
Saucier sequence.
288 This phenomenon can also be observed in a recent study of criminal-sentencing
practices following Booker. See generally Yang, 89 NYU L Rev 1268 (cited in note 242).
289 Judges appointed as federal magistrate judges and then later promoted to be dis-
trict court judges were assigned the date of their first federal appointment-that is, their
magistrate appointment. This coding decision had no notable effect on the results.
290 Three claims were decided by judges appointed as state court judges prior to
Pearson and as federal judges afterward. These claims were excluded from the study.
Their inclusion would not notably affect the results.
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By contrast, judges appointed after Pearson overruled Sauc-
ier took the qualified immunity shortcut in 17.0 percent of rul-
ings, roughly the same as the 18.6 percent rate of judges in the
previous era of unfettered discretion. This was more than double
the rate of judges appointed before Pearson.91
These observations are consistent with the theory that type
3 effects cause judges to gravitate toward an overturned legal
doctrine. Judges who served during the Saucier era have not
substantially changed their behavior following Pearson. They
may be habituated to the use of Saucier sequencing, or they may
have come to see it as the status quo, to be departed from only in
extraordinary circumstances. Judges appointed after Pearson
are not as susceptible to these influences, and their behavior
does not appear to be affected by the prior legal regime.292
The example of qualified immunity sequencing demon-
strates that this Article's model can successfully predict future
judicial behavior. It also offers further evidence293 that type 3 ef-
fects can have a substantial impact on judicial behavior, even
when considerations of time, effort, and difficulty of deci-
sionmaking point in the other direction.
IV. A NEW UNDERSTANDING OF LEGAL CHANGE
What does it mean that a law has "changed"? Formally, of
course, it means that a new doctrine has replaced an old one and
now governs legal disputes within its domain. But practically, as
a determinant of case outcomes, legal change may not be so
clear-cut. The actual governing law may be a mixture of the new
doctrine and the previous one-a mixture determined by judges'
experiences, habits, and aversions to costs.
The conventional account of judicial systems as efficient hi-
erarchies in which lower courts faithfully adopt new higher-
291 Despite a fairly small sample size of decisions by judges appointed after Pearson,
this difference is statistically significant at the 10 percent level.
292 Note that other explanations for the disparity among these judges cannot be
ruled out. For instance, Pearson was decided the day after President Barack Obama's
first inauguration, and thus all post-Pearson judges in the sample were nominated by
Obama. It is possible that political preferences are influencing judges' use of the quali-
fied immunity shortcut. However, a previous study of the shortcut in the district courts
found no link between use of the shortcut and the political party of the president who
appointed the judge. See Leong, 36 Pepperdine L Rev at 697-700 (cited in note 268).
293 See note 152 and accompanying text. See also Yang, 89 NYU L Rev at 1318-19
(cited in note 242) (finding that judges appointed before Booker were significantly less
likely to depart from the Guidelines than judges appointed after Booker).
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court decisions fails to capture a great deal of actual judicial
conduct. Changes in doctrine do not always result in changes in
lower court behavior. Practical legal change is not always abrupt
or comprehensive; it can be gradual or partial, and sensitive to
costs and status quo preferences. In some situations, a legal
change may not be complete until a new generation of judges re-
places the generation familiar with the prior law.294
Accordingly, creating a new doctrine is sometimes only the
first step in effecting legal change. Moreover, legal change cannot
be evaluated solely by examining a new statute or Supreme Court
case. The greater body of case law may not necessarily follow
these authorities. Scholars should consider lower court behavior
before making claims about a new law and its likely effects.
Observers attempting to predict judicial behavior should also
broaden the scope of their inquiry into judicial preferences. Schol-
ars already account for judges' ideological preferences when mod-
eling judicial behavior. They should do the same for judicial pref-
erences for a familiar status quo and lower decision costs, or they
risk overlooking powerful influences on judges' behavior.
The sections below discuss some additional implications of
this Article's model of judicial resistance to legal change. The
first Section examines the scope of resistance to legal change.
The second identifies some of its practical consequences. The
third describes how this Article's findings can shed light on de-
bates about judicial behavior and help lawmakers to design
more-efficient regimes for judicial decisionmaking. The fourth
discusses potential responses to the problems that resistance to
legal change may cause.
A. Daubert and the Ubiquity of Resistance to Legal Change
When a higher court or Congress changes the law, lower
courts may actively resist adopting the new doctrine, resulting
in either direct or indirect noncompliance. This is most likely to
occur when several of the resistance effects identified above are
present, as in transitions from rules to standards. But the po-
tential for resistance is present whenever there is a substantial
change in the law. Judges cannot help being at least somewhat un-
certain as to how a new law will operate and what its consequences
294 See Part III.E. In such cases, the adoption of new legal doctrines can resemble
the halting advance of new scientific paradigms. See, for example, Thomas S. Kuhn, The
Structure of Scientific Revolutions 148-52 (Chicago 2d ed 1970).
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will be. Uncertainty can lead to aversion, while familiarity may
cause judges to strongly prefer the prior doctrine.295
This Article's model thus suggests that judicial noncompli-
ance with doctrinal change may go far beyond the examples giv-
en above. Indeed, resistance effects likely operate as a drag on
legal change even when new doctrines do substantially and per-
vasively alter judicial practices. These effects might limit the
magnitude of change by working at the margins to push judges
in the direction of the prior, overturned legal regime. Judicial
resistance may operate to some degree in almost all legal transi-
tions, causing actual judicial behavior to diverge (in varying
degrees) from governing doctrine.
The aftermath of Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc,296 a major Supreme Court case on expert witness testimony,
provides one example of the persistent influence of overturned
law even in the midst of an otherwise-extensive change in lower
court practice. A multitude of tort cases-including personal in-
jury, medical malpractice, and product liability cases-involve
scientific evidence presented by expert witnesses. For most of
the twentieth century, such expert testimony was considered
admissible only if it had "gained general acceptance in the par-
ticular field in which it belongs."297 This "Frye standard," named
after the 1923 DC Circuit case from which it derived, was sup-
planted (in federal courts) by a new test created by the Supreme
Court in 1993. In Daubert, the Court held that trial judges must
assess whether scientific evidence will be reliable and relevant
to the task at hand before admitting it.298 In determining wheth-
er scientific evidence is reliable, the Court stated, judges should
consider a nonexhaustive list of factors: (1) whether the scien-
tific theory or technique has been tested or can be tested, (2)
whether it has been peer-reviewed and published, (3) what its
rate of error is, and (4) whether it has been generally accepted in
its field.299
Daubert had a major impact on the practice of tort law and
the behavior of trial judges. After Daubert, studies showed,
parties "challenged the admissibility of [scientific] evidence more
frequently, and judges scrutinized evidence more carefully,
295 See Part II.C.3.
296 509 US 579 (1993).
297 Frye v United States, 293 F 1013, 1014 (DC Cir 1923).
298 Daubert, 509 US at 592-93.
299 Id at 593-94.
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excluding a greater proportion of it."300 In contrast to their re-
sponses to eBay and Booker,301 practitioners and judges noticed a
substantial change in their practices following Daubert.302 Judg-
es and attorneys paid more attention to the reliability of poten-
tial expert witnesses, judges increasingly held pretrial hearings
on expert testimony, and attorneys made more objections and
filed more motions in limine to exclude experts. 0 3 Judges report-
ed employing the four Daubert factors when determining wheth-
er to admit scientific evidence.304
Yet even in the midst of this major change, there is evidence
of substantial resistance to the new regime and the strong influ-
ence of prior doctrine. Although judges have given scientific evi-
dence more scrutiny following Daubert, they often do so by ap-
plying essentially the same test as they did before the decision-
whether a scientific theory or claim has gained general ac-
ceptance in its field. That is, many courts applying Daubert "in
practice perform what is essentially a Frye analysis. 3o5 Studies
indicate that general acceptance continues to play a pivotal role
in Daubert admissibility determinations, 3o0 while unfamiliar and
complex new factors such as error rate and susceptibility to test-
ing have generally had little impact.3o7 Although judicial behavior
changed substantially and pervasively after Daubert, the influ-
ence of Frye has remained strong.
300 A. Leah Vickers, Daubert, Critique and Interpretation: What Empirical Studies
Tell Us about the Application of Daubert, 40 USF L Rev 109, 110 (2005).
301 See, for example, Jeffery T. Ulmer and Michael T. Light, The Stability of Case
Processing and Sentencing Post-Booker, 14 J Gender, Race & Just 143, 173-74 (2010).
302 See Carol Krafka, et al, Judge and Attorney Experiences, Practices, and Concerns
regarding Expert Testimony in Federal Civil Trials, 8 Psychology, Pub Pol & L 309, 322-
23, 329-30 (2002).
303 See id.
304 See Sophia I. Gatowski, et al, Asking the Gatekeepers: A National Survey of
Judges on Judging Expert Evidence in a Post-Daubert World, 25 L & Human Behav 433,
444-48 (2001).
305 Edward K. Cheng and Albert H. Yoon, Does Frye or Daubert Matter? A Study of
Scientific Admissibility Standards, 91 Va L Rev 471, 478 (2005).
306 See, for example, id; Lloyd Dixon and Brian Gill, Changes in the Standards for
Admitting Expert Evidence in Federal Civil Cases since the Daubert Decision, 8 Psychol-
ogy, Pub Pol & L 251, 286-87 (2002) (finding that general acceptance was sufficient for
admission pre-Daubert and, while no longer sufficient on its own, tends to result in ad-
mission post-Daubert); Nicole L. Waters and Jessica P. Hodge, The Effects of the Daubert
Trilogy in Delaware Superior Court *22 (National Center for State Courts, 2005), ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/8LKP-2H7U (noting that attorneys citing Daubert often use
general acceptance in their arguments).
307 See, for example, Cheng and Yoon, 91 Va L Rev at 478 (cited in note 305);
Gatowski, et al, 25 L & Human Behav at 444-48 (cited in note 302).
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The Daubert example suggests that overturned regimes may
exert some influence in virtually all legal transitions, by offering
a fallback position for judges faced with applying an unfamiliar
new test, or by influencing judges to prefer the prior status quo
even as they attempt in good faith to implement a new doctrine.
Given the near ubiquity of the effects discussed in Part II, some
resistance to legal change is likely to be the rule rather than the
exception.
B. Zombie Doctrines and Predicting Judicial Resistance
The phenomenon of judicial resistance to legal change can be
uncanny. Defunct doctrines, abolished and replaced by new laws,
appear to rise from their graves and walk the earth again, influ-
encing judges much as they did before being overturned. These
zombie-like doctrines present both problems and opportunities for
legal actors trying to predict and shapl judicial behavior.
As described above,3o8 this Article's model can be used to
predict judges' behavior in a variety of contexts. It can identify
new doctrines that are unlikely to command full compliance 309
and situations that are likely to cause judges to gravitate toward
familiar practices. 310 For instance, the model correctly predicted
that judicial behavior would change substantially less than an-
ticipated after Pearson, because of judges' habits and acquired
preferences for the former status quo. 311 It was also able to pre-
dict which judges were most likely to follow a prior legal regime
and which were most likely to rapidly adopt the new doctrine.312
By generating such predictions, the model can inform debates
about the meaning and impact of new Supreme Court or appel-
late court decisions. And it can allow practitioners and observers
to better forecast judicial behavior and case outcomes.
This Article's model can also help to clarify ongoing controver-
sies about the effects of doctrinal change. For example, scholars
have recently warned of a "revolution" in equitable remedies, as
higher courts have extended eBay's holding to other areas of
308 See Part II.D.3.
309 One example is a new test involving a tricky assessment of commercial harm.
See Parts III.A, III.C.
310 These situations may arise, for example, when inexpert judges are called on to
deal with difficult technical or empirical issues. See Parts ILA, II.C.3.a, II.D.3,
III.A, III.C.
311 See Part III.E.
312 See Part III.E.
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law, replacing the presumption that courts should issue an in-
junction with a complex, four-factor equitable test.313 Scholars
have also expressed concern about the "unfettered discretion"
that courts will possess in the absence of the "meaningful guid-
ance" offered by the presumptions. 3' 4
This Article's model predicts that the practical impact of
these recent rulings will be limited. Higher courts are command-
ing judges to abandon presumptions that many of them have
applied frequently over the years and adopt a new standard that
is both conceptually complex and a chore to apply. Most likely,
lower courts applying these new laws will continue to be influ-
enced by the overturned presumptions. They will likely continue
to grant injunctions at a high rate and employ cost-lowering doc-
trinal shortcuts when possible.
As in the equity context, the influence of zombie doctrines
can present serious practical problems for political or legal ac-
tors attempting to alter outcomes in legal disputes. Although the
Supreme Court likely intended its Campbell opinion to reduce
grants of summary judgment in fair use disputes, grants actual-
ly increased, in part because lower courts continued to cite and
apply an abrogated fair use presumption. 315 Despite Congress's
passage of the PSLRA, neither the number of securities class ac-
tions filed nor the value of such settlements has decreased at all,
and courts' failure to implement a major provision of the statute
(requiring Rule 11 review of all filings) has no doubt contributed
to this limited impact.316 Scholars recommending legislative so-
lutions to various legal or social problems should note these dif-
ficulties and consider whether, even if their proposed legislation
is enacted, judges will actually implement it.
In general, judicial resistance to doctrinal change may pre-
sent another obstacle to the pursuit of meaningful social change
via the courts. Scholars have lamented the failure of many pro-
gressive judicial opinions to substantially influence public policy
or social practices. 317 This Article suggests that the difficulty of
313 See Mark P. Gergen, John M. Golden, and Henry E. Smith, The Supreme Court's
Accidental Revolution? The Test for Permanent Injunctions, 112 Colum L Rev 203, 204,
216-19 (2012) (pointing to appellate cases that reversed long-standing equitable pre-
sumptions involving copyright infringement, administrative law, and the Federal Arbi-
tration Act).
314 Id at 242-43.
315 See Beebe, 156 U Pa L Rev at 572 (cited in note 129).
316 See Perino, 2003 U Ill L Rev at 929-35, 938, 939-42 (cited in note 153).
317 See, for example, Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope at 15-21, 71-72 (cited in note 2).
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changing behavior extends even to the lower court level. Not on-
ly do plaintiffs seeking social change through the courts face po-
litical, cultural, and economic constraints, but they must also
contend with widespread judicial resistance to any change to the
legal status quo.
C. Shaping Judicial Decisionmaking
This Article's findings can contribute to theoretical debates
over judicial preferences and behavior. For instance, several
scholars have argued that lower court judges favor standards
over rules because standards maximize their discretion, and dis-
cretion allows them to reach their preferred outcome in a greater
number of cases.318 Others have suggested that this analysis
may be oversimplified but have not directly challenged it on the-
oretical or empirical grounds' 19 This Article's model indicates
that lower court judges may disfavor standards for several rea-
sons, including increased time and effort costs, increased deci-
sion costs, and cognitive aversion toward the uncertainty that
discretion may entail. And the empirical evidence discussed
above suggests that judges often decline to use newly granted
discretionary power and instead gravitate toward more-
restrictive, bright-line rules. Rather than always favoring dis-
cretionary standards, lower court judges' preferences likely vary
based on factors such as the difficulty of deciding cases using a
standard, the intensity of their policy views, and their habits
and prior practices.
The evidence discussed in this Article may also point the way
toward new legal regimes that guide judicial decisionmaking
while still allowing judges flexibility to accommodate unusual
cases. When the law is changed from a bright-line rule to a
broader standard, judges appear to be significantly influenced
318 See, for example, Sydney Foster, Should Courts Give Stare Decisis Effect to Stat-
utory Interpretation Methodology?, 96 Georgetown L J 1863, 1906-07 (2008) (discussing
judges' preferences for maximizing discretion in order to maximize their power); Jona-
than R. Macey, Judicial Preferences, Public Choice, and the Rules of Procedure, 23 J
Legal Stud 627, 631 (1994) (finding that judges are likely to "maximize their ability to
make discretionary decisions" in order to "reach legal results that maximize their own
view of the good"); Mark A. Cohen, Explaining Judicial Behavior or What's "Unconstitu-
tional" about the Sentencing Commission?, 7 J L, Econ & Org 183, 186-87, 189 (1991)
(modeling judges' preferences for increased judicial discretion).
319 See, for example, Steven S. Gensler, Judicial Case Management: Caught in the
Crossfire, 60 Duke L J 669, 723 (2010). See also generally Janet Cooper Alexander,
Judges' Self-Interest and Procedural Rules: Comment on Macey, 23 J Legal Stud 647
(1994).
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by the prior rule, which often operates as a default from which
judges only rarely depart.320 This unintended outcome may actu-
ally have many advantages, especially in complex or technical
areas of the law. For judges lacking expertise in a given area, it
could have the benefits of a rule, allowing for quick, low-cost de-
cisionmaking and rendering judicial outcomes more predictable.
But expert or highly motivated judges would retain the freedom
to depart from the default rule in appropriate cases. This de-
fault-rule regime would, in some situations, perform better than
either a rule or a standard in producing optimal judicial deci-
sions while holding down decision costs. 321
Because default rules appear to influence judges as much as
they influence other decisionmakers, legislators and higher
courts could intentionally set up legal rules as defaults when
appropriate. They might, for instance, establish a baseline rule
(for example, "piloting an aircraft within one mile of a nuclear
power plant is unlawful") but allow judges to depart from it if
they give a detailed explanation of their reasons for doing so.
Lawmakers could even require the discussion of specific factors
in the explanation (for example, weather, air traffic, structure of
the plant, and pilot experience). This would likely have the effect
of driving inexpert or time-constrained judges toward the de-
fault rule, while still allowing expert or motivated judges to
reach the best outcome in outlier cases.
Further, the powerful influence on judges of numerical an-
chors322 suggests that there is room for voluntary guidelines to
play a much larger role in shaping judicial behavior. Lawmakers,
higher courts, or special commissions might promulgate volun-
tary guidelines for judges in areas in which outcomes are unpre-
dictable and inconsistent, as they often were in pre-Guidelines
criminal sentencing. For example, there tend to be very few
standards for alimony and child support awards, and judges are
expected to apply a multifactorial test in order to produce a nu-
merical outcome, making the results difficult to predict. Likewise,
punitive damages and pain and suffering awards tend to be highly
variable, and the amounts awarded often have little correlation
320 See note 104 and accompanying text.
321 See generally Louis Kaplow, Rules versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42
Duke L J 557 (1992) (discussing the relative costs and benefits of rules and standards).
322 See Parts IIB, III.D.
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with jurors' judgments about culpability.323 Voluntary guidelines
could promote uniformity and reduce decision costs by providing
consistent numbers for judges but while still allowing judges to
depart from the numbers in unusual cases.
D. Effective Legal Change
As discussed above, formal, doctrinal changes alone may
prove ineffective in altering the behavior of lower court judges or
the outcomes of legal disputes. This Section describes how, by
better understanding judicial resistance to new doctrines, appel-
late judges and legal reformers might more effectively change
lower court practices.324
Let us start with the least-drastic measure. Higher courts
might reduce resistance to their new rulings simply by enhanc-
ing (through conscious, dogged effort) the clarity of their written
opinions. Language that is at all vague, subtle, or debatable is
unlikely to produce significant practical changes in lower court
behavior-especially when more than one of the resistance
effects are implicated.
Vague language and an excess of subtlety likely account for
several new doctrines' failures to influence judicial behavior.
Phillips v AWH Corp,325 an en banc Federal Circuit decision en-
couraging consideration of the entirety of a patent application in
interpreting patent claim language (and discouraging the use of
323 See, for example, Cass R. Sunstein, Daniel Kahneman, and David Schkade, As-
sessing Punitive Damages (with Notes on Cognition and Valuation in Law), 107 Yale L J
2071, 2074 (1998).
324 The normative implications of reducing judicial noncompliance with new doc-
trines are mostly beyond the scope of this Article, and I will offer only a few preliminary
thoughts. The extent to which increased compliance with new doctrines is desirable will,
of course, largely be a function of the value of those doctrines. Beyond that, it is possible
that widespread, mostly indirect noncompliance with new doctrines allows judges to al-
locate their energy most efficiently, hedge against misguided legal changes, or lower
transition costs imposed by sudden doctrinal shifts. I think that it is more likely that the
benefits of effective legal change will outweigh any advantages of noncompliance. Great-
er compliance would bring lower court behavior closer to formally controlling doctrine.
As a result, parties would be better able to predict how judges will resolve legal disputes,
and new laws could be evaluated more cleanly on the basis of the outcomes that they
would produce, without the noise created by judges still following abrogated doctrines. I
would also cautiously posit that doctrinal changes have more often than not been for the
good, and that over time the law will likely continue to improve, becoming more just, ef-
ficient, and equitable. If so, then the normative value of ensuring that doctrinal changes
actually change lower court behavior may be substantial.
325 415 F3d 1303 (Fed Cir 2005) (en banc).
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dictionaries),326 has had little effect on subsequent Federal Cir-
cuit or district court cases. 327 The likely culprit is the court's
well-intentioned refusal to "provide a rigid algorithm for claim
construction" and its decision to instead "simply attempt[] to
explain why, in general, certain types of evidence are more val-
uable than others."328
Likewise, the Supreme Court's recent alteration of the civil-
pleading standard from notice pleading to a requirement that
plaintiffs plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face"329 has had no significant effect on pleading
dismissals.330 Judges were already likely to disfavor this kind of
change given that the old, familiar standard was clear and easy
to apply, while the new standard arguably calls for substantially
greater scrutiny of pleadings. But another major obstacle is the
Twombly opinion's inconsistency and lack of clarity, and the un-
certain magnitude of its departure from previous standards.331
Lower courts are unlikely to make difficult and often-unwanted
changes to their prior routines if they have not received a clear
signal to do so. Accordingly, a common practice of some appel-
late courts-writing opinions with the expectation that every
subtle doctrinal point and policy rationale will be taken as gos-
pel by lower courts-appears to be seriously misguided. Simple
and emphatic explanations of how lower courts should act might
be less likely to produce elegant opinions but are more likely to
yield effective legal change.
326 See id at 1314, 1320-21.
327 See generally R. Polk Wagner and Lee Petherbridge, Did Phillips Change Any-
thing? Empirical Analysis of the Federal Circuit's Claim Construction Jurisprudence, in
Shyamkrishna Balganesh, ed, Intellectual Property and the Common Law 123 (Cam-
bridge 2013). See also Michael Saunders, Note, A Survey of Post-Phillips Claim Con-
struction Cases, 22 Berkeley Tech L J 215, 236 (2007) (finding little change in results
post-Phillips, aside from possible superficial changes in methodology).
328 Phillips, 415 F3d at 1324. See also Wagner and Petherbridge, Did Phillips
Change Anything? at 30 (cited in note 327) (attributing Phillips's lack of impact in part
to the "open-ended nature of the Phillips language," notwithstanding the opinion's oth-
erwise "clear choice in favor of a more holistic approach" to claim construction).
329 Bell Atlantic Corp v Twombly, 550 US 544, 570 (2007).
330 See William H.J. Hubbard, Testing for Change in Procedural Standards, with
Application to Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 42 J Legal Stud 35, 57 (2013) (finding that, even
in cases filed before Twombly and thus not influenced by selection effects, neither the
rate of dismissal on motion nor the rate of dismissal as a fraction of all filed cases
changed significantly after Twombly).
331 See Robert G. Bone, Twombly, Pleading Rules, and the Regulation of Court
Access, 94 Iowa L Rev 873, 881-82 (2009).
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That said, even clear opinions frequently encounter re-
sistance among lower court judges. To defeat especially persis-
tent zombie rules, higher courts may have to engage in overkill.
That is, higher courts can respond to strong judicial resistance
by repeatedly issuing opinions that vigorously admonish lower
courts for following old rules. For example, after the Supreme
Court issues an opinion establishing a new doctrine, the Court
could examine lower court decisions for signs that the old, de-
funct law is continuing to influence judicial behavior. It could
then grant certiorari in a case that appears influenced by the old
law, reverse it, prominently criticize the lower court or courts,
and again emphatically state that the old rule must be aban-
doned and the new way adopted. Although repetitive opinions
might raise efficiency concerns, any harm to efficiency is likely
outweighed by an increase in efficacy. By sending an unusually
strong signal that the status quo has changed and that the
Court is monitoring the issue, repetitive opinions can provoke
judges to pay particular attention to the application of a new
doctrine, making them more likely to avoid or overcome uncon-
scious biases.332
Something like this appears to have happened in the quali-
fied immunity context. Following Siegert, which admonished
judges to resolve whether a constitutional right had been violat-
ed before addressing qualified immunity, courts continued to
take the immunity shortcut at a high rate.333 After the Saucier
Court repeated Siegert's command and clearly and emphatically
scolded courts to address violations first, lower courts sharply
curtailed their use of the shortcut. 334 In fact, somewhat increased
compliance was observed even before Saucier, following the 1999
cases Conn v Gabbert335 and Wilson v Layne, Deputy United
States Marshal,336 which cited Siegert for the proposition that a
court must address an alleged constitutional violation before
considering immunity. 337 Repeated declarations of the new rule
sent a powerful message to lower courts, and effective legal
change resulted.
332 It may also increase the perceived risk of reversal or reputational harm and
thereby deter intentional resisters as well.
333 See text accompanying note 259.
334 See Sobolski and Steinberg, Note, 62 Stan L Rev at 553, 555 (cited in note 257).
335 526 US 286 (1999).
336 526 US 603 (1999).
337 See Conn, 526 US at 290; Wilson, 526 US at 609.
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Nonjudicial actors can also play an important role in suc-
cessfully modifying lower court practices. By studying the influ-
ence of overturned doctrines in lower courts' rulings under a
new legal regime, legal scholars can alert appellate courts to
problems of indirect or direct noncompliance and warn trial
courts of the possibility of unconsciously reverting to prior
methods of decisionmaking. Simply by recognizing their tenden-
cies to gravitate toward defunct but familiar legal rules, judges
may be better able to avoid doing so.338 A lack of awareness of
the potential for resistance, exacerbated by the conventional as-
sumption that compliance with controlling doctrine is universal,
is currently a substantial obstacle to effective legal change in
the lower courts.
Reformers may also encourage compliance with new doc-
trines by focusing on the nonlegal aspects of judicial deci-
sionmaking. Familiarizing judges with technological, scientific,
or statistical concepts relevant to the application of new legal
tests may significantly reduce judicial opposition to change.339
Advocacy for doctrinal reforms should go hand in hand with the
development of judicial-education programs to inform judges
about new laws and the contexts in which those laws operate.
Providing reference manuals or voluntary guidelines designed to
aid judges making decisions in technical or complex areas of law
can also promote compliance.340 These approaches may make the
application of novel tests quicker and easier, allow judges to be-
come familiar with new doctrines, and give judges a sense of cer-
tainty about how the doctrines should be applied and what the
results will be. By doing so, these approaches can minimize the
effects that lead to resistance to legal change.
CONCLUSION
Conventional models of judicial compliance have focused on
judges' institutional roles and political preferences, and these
models have largely assumed high levels of conformity with new
laws. These accounts have overlooked perhaps the most im-
portant sources of noncompliance: judicial resistance to higher
decision costs and judicial preferences for familiar, status quo
338 See Guthrie, Rachlinski, and Wistrich, 86 Cornell L Rev at 821-24 (cited in note
106) (noting that awareness of cognitive biases may allow judges to reduce their impact).
339 See Cheng and Yoon, 91 Va L Rev at 504 (cited in note 305).
340 See id; Federal Judicial Center 2000, Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence 2-
8 (Lexis 2d ed 2000).
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doctrines. This Article has developed a detailed account of these
effects and integrated it with existing models of judicial behav-
ior. The resulting new model is better able to predict judicial be-
havior in a variety of situations.
The evidence of widespread judicial noncompliance with
new doctrines described above suggests the need for a better un-
derstanding of legal change itself. Changing the law that actual-
ly resolves legal disputes is not as simple, or as immediate, as it
appears. Legal change can be gradual or incomplete; some lower
courts might reject it outright, while others might adopt some
but not all components of a new doctrine. Defunct laws may be
influencing judges and determining outcomes from beyond the
grave.
This new understanding of legal change poses challenges for
judges, practitioners, and scholars as they try to predict and
shape legal outcomes. Legal actors should not assume that they
can fully understand a new law and its consequences simply by
analyzing the latest controlling opinion on the matter, or even
by surveying judges' political preferences. The behavior of lower
courts is ultimately governed by a much broader set of factors.
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